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405 
Justifying Copyright in the Age of  
Digital Reproduction:  
The Case of Photographers  
Jessica Silbey* 
This Article explores the justification for copyright from two 
sources: seminal court cases and accounts from photographic authors. It 
takes as its premise that copyright protection requires justification, not 
only because creative work is frequently made and disseminated without 
reliance on copyright, but because, in the age of digital technology, 
practices of creative production and dissemination have sufficiently 
changed to question the existing contours of the forty-year-old Copyright 
Act. Why read the photographers’ stories alongside the court cases? Each 
present contested views of copyright’s relation to creativity. At times, the 
photographers’ accounts and the case law strengthen and reinforce each 
other; other times, their differences challenge the other’s coherence. 
Reading the accounts side-by-side further identifies synergies that may 
serve as moral confirmation for winners in the copyright system. At the 
same time, comparisons reveal opportunities for resistance by those who 
contest copyright law’s explanation of how it promotes creativity as a 
function of “progress.” The social structures made legible through the 
overlapping stories of creativity, copying, and copyright delineate in 
diverse ways the object of value (“copyright” and “original works of 
authorship”) as well as the anxieties regarding digital age trends of 
widespread dissemination and verbatim copying. Simultaneously, these 
same stories signal an expectation of access to the tools of distribution 
and of opportunity to practice one’s own art, undermining copyright’s 
exclusivity and value associated with it. Understanding this complex 
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position regarding digital reproduction, creative practices, industry 
changes, and professional opportunity may be useful for reforming 
copyright in a manner that includes rapidly evolving aesthetic practices 
and diverse creators of the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the justification for copyright from two sources: seminal 
court cases and accounts from photographic authors. It takes as its premise that 
copyright protection requires justification, not only because creative work is 
frequently made and disseminated without reliance on copyright, but because, in the 
age of digital technology, practices of creative production and dissemination have 
sufficiently changed to question the existing contours of the forty-year old 
Copyright Act. To be sure, this paper’s conclusions as to copyright’s justifications 
are contingent upon the reach and applicability of the sources used. The court cases 
are widely applicable as seminal opinions.1 The case of photographers, however, 
may produce particularized accounts of copyright’s importance. Photographers may 
face aesthetic and technical issues in the digital age specific to their medium, 
available business models, and professional communities. Another question this 
paper raises, therefore, is whether the case of photographic copyright in the digital 
age is a special case or if it provides an analogy for authorship in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
1. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 61–73 (4th ed. 2015). 
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The seminal cases and the photographers’ accounts are structured as stories 
about creativity’s process and products. As stories, they are “intimately related to, if 
not a function of, the impulse to moralize reality, that is, to identify it with the social 
system that is the source of any morality that we can imagine.”2 The social system 
is both the subject and framework of the stories told in which creativity and 
copyright are related in struggle. And the law, as part of that social system, forms a 
background of rights and responsibilities structuring expectations and aspirations 
for how that struggle should resolve. Reading the cases alongside the 
photographers’ accounts of their aesthetic and business practices clarifies the 
relevance of the struggle between copyright and creativity for digital photography, 
a ubiquitous and important form of communication and visual art today.3 
Explanations for copyright in both the court cases and the photographer’s 
accounts do not contain all marks of stories. But the particular struggles among 
authors, publishers and purported infringers, between legal rules and complaints of 
their irrelevancy or inadequacy, enable evaluation of copyright’s role in promoting 
creativity beyond the particular to general cases. This feature of projection, a core 
story function with origins in the parable, is essential to reasoning and meaning in a 
larger social context.4 And when the story coheres internally and through projection, 
it binds people within a social world remade and strengthened by the story itself.5 
In this way, stories may be “legible reflections of social structures”6 with their 
particular forms and relations of features “lay[ing] claim to a limited range of 
potentialities and constraints.”7 
These stories about authorship in the age of rapid reproduction reveal 
opportunities to act, to work with others, or prevent future harm within in the social 
structures imagined and described. The legal cases recount stories of creativity 
 
2. HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM: NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND 
HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION 14 (1987). 
3. Martin Heiferman, If You See Something, Say Something: Why We Need to Talk About Visual 
Literacy, Now, in VISION ANEW: THE LENS AND SCREEN ARTS 64–67 (Adam Bell & Charles Traub 
eds., 2015). 
4. MARK TURNER, THE LITERARY MIND 7 (1996) (“The projection of story operates 
throughout everyday life and throughout the most elite and sacred literature. . . . Parable . . . has seemed 
to literary critics to belong not merely to expression and not exclusively to literature, but rather . . . to 
mind in general.”). 
5. WHITE, supra note 2, at 24 (“[V]alue attached to narrativity . . . arises out of a desire to have 
real events display the coherent, integrity . . . and closure of an image of life that is and can only be 
imaginary.”); id. (“Where in any account of reality, narrativity is present, we can be sure that morality or 
a moralizing impulse is present too. There is no other way that reality can be endowed with the kind of 
meaning that both displays itself in its consummation and withholds itself by its displacement to another 
story ‘waiting to be told,’ just beyond the confines of ‘the end.’”); see also Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, 
Narrating Social Structures: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority, 108 AM. J. SOC. 1328, 1341 (2003) 
(“Some authors argue that stories as a form of social action, reflect and sustain institutional and cultural 
arrangements, bridging the gap between daily social interaction and large-scale social structures.”) 
(citations omitted). 
6. CAROLINE LEVINE, FORMS: WHOLE, RHYTHM, HIERARCHY, NETWORK 12 (2015). 
7. Id. at 6. 
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related in a system of copyright regulation, idealizing the social system as 
compromised of similarly situated individuals with copyright as an incentive and 
accumulation of expressive work the goal. The photographers’ stories share the 
aspiration of similarly situated authors and the desire for copyright to respect their 
efforts, but the contemporary system of industrial capital they describe as 
structuring their work is tainted by inequitable hierarchies and thus is far from ideal. 
In other words, these stories are both aesthetic and political. Paying close attention 
to their constraints and opportunities—what Caroline Levine describes as formal 
affordances—sheds light on copyright’s fitness and flaws for creative production in 
the digital age.8 
Why read the photographers’ stories alongside the court cases? Each presents 
contested views of copyright’s relation to creativity, e.g., creativity as a function of 
the promise of anti-copying protection. At times, the stories strengthen and 
reinforce each other; other times, their differences challenge the coherence of each 
account. Moreover, reading the accounts side-by-side identifies synergies that may 
serve as moral confirmation for winners in the copyright system. At the same time, 
comparisons reveal opportunities for resistance by those who contest the law’s 
explanation of copyright’s method of promoting creativity as a function of 
“progress.”9 The social structures made legible through the overlapping stories of 
creativity, copying, and copyright deserve attention for their strong normative 
resonance regarding the marks of authorship and the function of anti-copying 
protection. Not only do they form an object of value to analyze and critique as such 
(“copyright” and “original works of authorship”), but they delineate the anxieties of 
digital age trends of widespread dissemination and a default for copying. 
Simultaneously, and somewhat paradoxically, these same stories signal an 
expectation of access to the tools of distribution and of opportunity to practice 
one’s own art. Understanding this complex position regarding digital reproduction, 
creativity, industry changes, and professional opportunity may be useful for 
reforming copyright in a manner that includes rapidly evolving aesthetic practices 
and the creators of the future. 
Despite the photographers’ stories taking place in the present day, the legal 
account begins in 1884 with Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.10 Sarony is a case 
with remarkable contemporary resonance. Like contemporary photographers, the 
1884 case justifies photographic copyright in terms of pre-shutter activities of 
photographic composition and preparation. Also, the case confronts challenges of 
technological evolution and the democratization of the photographic industry for 
nineteenth century photographic art and businesses that are magnified today. The 
1903 case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co. resolves a question Sarony  
left open—the copyright status of “ordinary” photography as compared to art 
 
8. Id. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
10. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
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photography—by deferring to the aesthetic tastes of the public and rejecting 
aesthetic hierarchy.11 As we will see, contemporary photographers’ accounts of 
creative practices and aesthetic value resonate with Sarony and largely reject Bleistein, 
setting up a collision for the digital age when nearly all photography that circulates 
on the internet is both amateur and “ordinary” leaving the originality standard 
“destabilized and overextended.”12 
The third case is Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co.13 It rejects 
copyright’s “sweat of the brow doctrine”—a rule which would protect creative work 
based on skill and labor—in favor of Bleistein’s minimal originality standard from 
1903. Although Feist reaffirms copyright protection for nearly all work made by 
photographic authors, its devaluation of skill and labor as factors in copyright 
protection dilutes the professional photographer’s status and her market leverage in 
the digital age. Original selection and arrangement may be copyright protected 
features of photographs, but hard work or skills have no purchase in copyright law. 
“It may seem unfair that . . . the fruit of the . . . labor may be used by others without 
compensation . . . [but] [t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means 
by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.”14 Feist tells a story of 
competitive industries thriving despite copyrightable subject matter being limited to 
creative expression and facts being free to all (even facts collected after significant 
investment of time and money). By contrast, photographers’ stories of the value 
they bring to picture making rely on discipline and craft. Feist’s winners are not 
professional photographers for whom “sweat of the brow” defines their aesthetic 
and business practices. They may retain copyright over their images because Sarony 
and Bleistein remain good law, but the proliferation of photographs in the digital 
age, made by amateurs and professionals, nearly all of which are protected by 
copyright, renders unsustainable the marketplace for many professional 
photographers. Does this matter? And if it does, how and what is to do be done? 
The social situations that Feist and professional photographers describe in their 
accounts justifying copyright protection present different benefits and risks of the 
digital domain. 
Side-by-side, photographers’ accounts and seminal court cases illustrate the 
law’s tense relationship with creative and innovative industry professionals as  
it attempts to harmonize private interests and the public good within a  
rapidly changing technological context. The stories revolve around familiar 
tensions: originality/copying; individual personality/sociality; human/machine; 
work of art/labor; high art/ordinary art; commercial worth/aesthetic value. At 
 
11. Id. at 59 (“This may be true in regard to the ordinary production of a photograph, and that 
in such case a copyright is no protection. On the question as thus stated we decide nothing.”); see 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
12. Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright – Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database, 
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 388 (2012). 
13. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel., 499 U.S. 340, 349–50 (1991). 
14. Id. 
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stake in the photographic accounts is the blending of livelihood and professional 
respect and the structure of these dialectical tensions for the survival of a 
professional class of artists. The legal stories delineating copyright as intentionally 
more ubiquitous and democratic and with more starkly defined public domain 
features ironically degrades human efforts, replacing diverse human values with 
narrow economic ones. The dissonance created focuses blame on twenty-first 
century copying technology (the internet) and its users, instead of a legal structure 
that ignores distributive justice and sustainable wage labor. Comparing these stories 
uncovers opportunities to build alliances between authors and audiences broadly 
construed by naming shared stakes, such as wage equity and access. This is the first 
step toward reconfiguring rules (law) and structures (society and technology) to 
reform copyright in a manner that accounts for evolving aesthetic practices, diverse 
creators and broad audiences of the future. 
I. BURROW-GILES LITHOGRAPHIC CO. V. SARONY AND  
CREATIVITY FINGERPRINTS 
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony is the first Supreme Court case to 
declare photography worthy of authorship, and thus of copyright protection, 
despite photography’s mechanized process.15 Photography was statutorily added to 
the list of copyrightable works in 1865, but not until 1884 did the Supreme Court 
explain why photographs were authored as the Constitution’s intellectual property 
clause requires.16 Photography was a new technique in the late 1800s, “promoted as 
a . . . mechanical science . . . able to produce a direct transcription of the scene 
before it.”17 It was used more often as evidence than art.18 As Oliver Wendell 
Holmes said photography was a “mirror with a memory,”19 challenging its status as 
protectable human expression. 
A.  Photographic Copyright 
The dispute in Burrow-Giles concerned the lithographic company’s 
unauthorized reproduction and selling of 85,000 copies of photographer Napoleon 
Sarony’s portrait of Oscar Wilde.20 The defendant sought to evade liability with two 
arguments. First, the lithography company claimed a photograph is not a “writing” 
by an “author” as the Constitution requires. The photograph is a mere output of a 
machine and thus was not the proper subject of copyright, which protects authors, 
 
15. Terry S. Kogan, The Enigma of Photography, Depiction, and Copyright Originality, 25 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869, 872 (2015). 
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting copyright to authors of writings for limited times). 
17. Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of 
Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 389 (2004). 
18. Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 13–14 (1998). 
19. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Stereoscope and the Stereograph, in CLASSIC ESSAYS ON 
PHOTOGRAPHY 71, 74 (Alan Trachtenberg ed., 1980). 
20. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54 (1884). 
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not automated processes. Second, and, relatedly, the defendant argued that 
photographs are by definition unoriginal, removing them from the scope of 
copyright protection, because photography merely copies nature by making 
“mechanical reproduction[s] of the physical features or outlines of some object.”21 
The Court decides both issues on similar grounds by finding human traces in 
the work produced and defining those traces as the value protected.22 To make its 
point, the court relies on the first copyrightable subject matter—maps and charts. 
Both intend to accurately depict geography, but both are the original “writings” 
protected by the first Copyright Act. As such, the result of photographic processes, 
even if intended to depict reality, can also be protected by copyright as long as the 
“ideas in the mind of the author are given visible expression.”23 Famously, the court 
wrote that an “author . . . is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin, originator, 
maker;’ . . . the nature of copyright . . . was . . . the exclusive right of a man to the 
production of his own genius or intellect.”24 This first basis of copyright protection 
is a story about equality among writings and authors of writings, even if made with 
new and mysterious tools. There may be traces of the human in both maps and 
photographs. Like a pen on paper or etching on metal, the photograph owes its 
origin to the photographer’s use of the camera. In all of these cases, the writing 
comes from the person. It is an authored writing in that sense. 
In addition, the particular contribution of this author (Sarony) to this writing 
(the Oscar Wilde portrait) was obvious. Reciting the findings of fact from the trial 
court, the Supreme Court writes: 
[I]n regard to the photograph in question, . . . it is a “useful, new, 
harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and . . . plaintiff made the 
same . . . entirely from his own original mental conception, to which he 
gave visible form by posing the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, 
selecting and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various 
accessories in said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present 
graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting 
and evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, 
arrangement, or representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the 
picture in suit.25 
From this reasoning generates the future courts’ reliance on photographer’s 
pre-shutter activity—selection, arrangement and framing—as the unique and 
human contributions that render photographs original works of authorship.26 In 
 
21. Id. at 59. 
22. Id. at 58–59. 
23. Id. at 58. 
24. Id. at 57–58. 
25. Id. at 60. 
26. E.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000); Mannion v. Coors Brewing, 
377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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other words, photographers intervene to make photographs original by 
“superintend[ing] the arrangement, . . . form[ing] the picture.”27 
In deciding the case for Napoleon Sarony, a prominent portrait photographer 
at the time,28 the Court erects a conflict between humans and machines concerning 
copyright’s protected subject matter. The conflict revolves around a dialectical 
tension between innate human contributions, “the exclusive right of a man to the 
production of his own genius or intellect” and the “merely mechanical” process of 
“light on the prepared plate” that transfers “to the plate the visible representation 
of some existing object, the accuracy of this representation being its highest 
merit.”29 In this hierarchy of humans over machines regarding copyright’s 
protection, we hear rumblings of fear of automation and desire for control over  
it. We also hear a resigned understanding that humans and machines will have to 
learn to co-exist. By distinguishing the personal contribution to the representation 
of nature from mechanical reproduction, the Court describes what copyright does 
(protecting people not mechanical processes) and says why: because human genius 
or intellect has will, which is the source of its moral authority “involv[ing] 
originating, making, [and] producing as the inventive or mastermind, the thing 
which is to be protected, whether it be a drawing, or a painting, or a photograph.”30 
Human will and its domination of machines forms the background of the rule 
and its exception declaring most photographs copyrightable. Sarony’s photograph 
was protected by copyright because he “superintended” its arrangement making a 
“graceful picture.”31 But not all photographs may be so protected.32 Where “the 
accuracy of th[e] representation [is] [the photograph’s] highest merit . . . [which is] 
true in regard to the ordinary production of a photograph, . . . in such case a 
copyright is no protection.”33 In other words, when the machine is in control, as 
opposed to the person operating the machine, no copyright lies. When the machine 
is in control, there is no originality, only copying. There is no individual personality, 
only reproductions of nature. There may be beauty (nature can be beautiful), but 
copyright protection derives from human contributions. 
Another background consideration shapes the outcome of Burrow-Giles. Not 
only must humans control machines under the logic of copyright law, but also the 
products of control worthy of protection are not “ordinary” photographs that  
are the “mere mechanical reproduction of the physical features . . . of some 
 
27. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (quoting Nottage  
v. Jackson, (1883) 11 Q.B. 627 (Eng.)). Indeed, Sarony, the plaintiff photographer in this case, has been 
described as a “modern-day director, cajoling, parodying, and even intimidating his sitters to elicit 
dramatic and expressive representations.” ROBERT HIRSCH, SEIZING THE LIGHT: A SOCIAL & 
AESTHETIC HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 87–88 (3d ed. 2017). 
28. HIRSCH, supra note 27, at 87–88. 
29. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59. 
30. Id. at 61. 
31. Id. at 54. 
32. Id. at 59. 
33. Id. 
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object, . . . involv[ing] no originality of thought . . . in the intellectual operation 
connected with its visible reproduction.”34 There are, therefore, two morals that 
emerge from Burrow-Giles. Humans shall control automation (not the other way 
around) and the “inventive or master mind” deserves copyright not the “manual 
operat[or].”35 
Notice this is not explicitly a story about recuperating investment in skill, 
practice, or equipment that copyright exclusivity might enable, which is today a 
common justification for copyright grounded in economic theory.36 And it is not a 
story about leaving the “ordinary” photographs that are mere mechanical 
reproductions of reality in the public domain to avoid copyright thickets that thwart 
the public interest in dissemination, education, and collaboration.37 Those stories 
will be told later; arising only after copyright expands with demands from authors 
to control competition. Instead, the Burrow-Giles court tells a story about how 
humans who tame machines and express their “genius or intellect” through the 
mechanical process are granted copyright authorship as a matter of moral authority 
and human-centered law in the age of mechanical reproduction. Intriguingly, more 
than a century later, this is the same story contemporary photographers tell about 
the reason copyright should protect their work and their status as authors in an 
increasingly competitive market for professional photography. The differences in 
their stories and the twentieth century justification for copyright concern Burrow-
Giles’ open question about the authorship status of ordinary photographs. In 1903, 
Bleistein addresses this question broadening copyright’s reach and diminishing the 
market leverage copyright provides professional photographers.38 
B. Digital Photographers’ Creative Contributions 
Sarah Newman is an award-winning photographer and visual artist. Currently 
in her thirties, she has been making photographs since high school. She attended 
college and graduate school working intensively with photography, assisted 
professional fine art photographers for several years, and developed her portfolio. 
She is currently the Creative Director of Harvard University’s Metalab, an “idea 
foundry” experimenting with the “networked arts and humanities.”39 I interviewed 
 
34. Id. Here, the Court presages the inapplicability of copyright to “slavish copying.” Bridgeman 
Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting 1 MELVILLE  
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E][2], at 2–131 (1998)). 
35. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59. 
36. Richard Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57 
(2005). 
37. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59; see also L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (“To extend copyrightability to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for 
harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public 
domain work.”). 
38. See infra Part II (discussing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)). 
39. META LAB AT HARVARD, https://metalabharvard.github.io/ [https://perma.cc/C6A9-
854L] ( last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
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Sarah as part of a larger empirical project studying the changing aesthetic and 
business practices of photographers in the digital age.40 Sarah gave the following 
answer in response to a question about becoming a professional photographer in 
the digital age. 
Everybody has a camera . . . . There’s a shit ton of pictures,  
and . . . production of photographs and quantity of floating  
pictures, . . . everybody’s a photographer now . . . . So there’s that, and 
then in terms of the originality, or sort of making something new, 
photography’s different than other media because it requires something to 
be existing in the world to base the photograph on, and in photography’s 
history, it was kind of about copying the world. [A]nd for that reason, [it 
replaced] . . . other sort of forms of copying representation. But 
photography’s relationship, in my opinion, to those objects in the world is 
that [photography is] more closely tied [to the objects] than . . . drawing. 
Because it’s a causal relationship, and I think that’s different, and 
important, in that the object is required in order for the subject to be 
depicted, . . . the light has to reflect off of it. So . . . people often mistake 
[the image for the thing]. . . [and] see past the surface of the photograph. 
[A] lot of people see the subject, they don’t see the photograph. They see, 
if there’s a picture of a tree, they see the tree. They just kinda [sic] see past 
[the]. . . mediation of the world. [I]t’s like . . . the Magritte paintings [Ceci 
n’est pas une pipe] . . . . It’s kind of like that. [W]hat is [this]? [A] picture 
of a tree, it’s a tree . . . no it’s a photograph. It’s the same kind of thing, but 
it’s even harder with photography.41 
Sarah’s experience and understanding of photography as an aesthetic practice 
articulates the tense relationship between mimetic representation and creativity. She 
describes the making of photographs as a “causal relationship” in the same way the 
Burrow-Giles defendant described a photograph as “being a reproduction on paper 
of the exact features of some natural object.”42 But like the Burrow-Giles court, Sarah 
insists that making photographs as an artist is the process of showing an audience 
more than the subject of the picture. She says “if there’s a picture of a tree, they see 
 
40. Data for this paper was collected over two years as part of a larger qualitative empirical 
project investigating the changing aesthetic and business practices of photographers in the digital  
age. The project is on-going in collaboration with Professors Eva Subotnik and Peter DiCola. We have 
interviewed thirty-two photographers distributed among relevant genres of photography (event, 
commercial, photojournalism, portrait, and fine art) and ranging in experience from emerging 
professional photographers, to established photographers, to famous ones. We also interviewed 
photographers who are both freelance and staff. Semi-structured interviews with photographers last 
approximately sixty to ninety minutes and are transcribed, coded, and analyzed using qualitative analytic 
software. 
41. Interview with Sarah Newman, Creative Director, Harvard Meta Lab, in Cambridge, Mass., 
Tr. at 1–2 (Sept. 29, 2016). 
42. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56. 
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the tree. They just kinda [sic] see past . . . the meditation of the world.”43 But she 
says, it’s not only a tree, it’s a photograph.44 
Sarah’s early experience with photography when discovering the practice of 
making pictures informs her understanding of how photography is an interaction 
with the world, not just a reflection of it. She explains below. 
[T]here’s all these layers of reality[ ] and . . . things we can perceive and 
experience, but somehow having a camera[ ] and . . . interacting with  
the world, in all these layers of experience, . . . gave me more  
agency . . . [t]o . . . make creative expressions and interpretations of what I 
was seeing. So it was almost as if I were just starting to write poetry or 
something. I ha[d] this tool that I c[ould] use, and anything that would 
normally be kind of mundane became a lot more interesting, because I 
always had my camera with me . . . . [P]retty much anywhere I went, I had 
a camera . . . so I wasn’t just receiving, and engaging, I was actually 
searching for meaning . . . .45 
Much like the Burrow-Giles decision compares photography to “all forms of 
writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the 
author are given visible expression,” Sarah describes the camera as a “tool” and 
photographs like other forms of art (such as “poetry”) for seeing the world in a new 
way.46 She personally experiences that vision and aims to bring it to audiences with 
her work. Her first teacher and mentor would help develop this visionary practice 
by 
point[ing] out things that we might not notice in pictures. He would  
say . . . , “You see this thing in the background, how the silhouette of that 
mimics the silhouette of that person standing on the other side,” . . . “[y]ou 
see how the edges are activated,” or, . . . “you wouldn’t think to offset 
this.” It was all very formal. He didn’t talk about meaning, what pictures 
meant. He didn’t talk about emotion. Which was . . . interesting, . . . and 
having had a lot of photography training since then, I actually think it’s a 
great way to introduce people to photography.47 
Sarah’s photographic praxis renders inseparable the human and her machine. 
She may prioritize human agency as the will that generates and gives form to the 
art, but she is not describing the relationship as hierarchical the way the Burrow-Giles 
court did.48 Photographic art helps us see things in the world differently and from 
new perspectives. It may also transform how we relate to the world. In this way, 
Sarah explains photographic art as quintessentially original, making something new 
 
43. Interview with Sarah Newman, supra note 41, at 2. 
44. Id. (emphasis added). 
45. Id. at 4. 
46. Id.; Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58 (“Congress very properly has declared these to include all 
forms of writing, printing, engravings, etchings, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are 
given visible expression.”). 
47. Interview with Sarah Newman, supra note 41, at 6. 
48. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61; see also Farley, supra note 17, at 431. 
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from the photographer’s intervention “interfacing with the world, and . . . placing a 
viewer in a space[ ] even if there’s no human subjects in the space.”49 
Sarah doesn’t go as far as to distinguish between novel and “ordinary” 
photographs as Burrow-Giles does. But she does make a distinction between art 
photographers and other people who take pictures: 
I think . . . [many] people . . . don’t appreciate . . . what photography is as 
an art form. Even really educated people, I think, understand painting as a 
genre, but have a lot more trouble grasping photography as a genre of art, 
even now. Even if they say, “Yes, yeah, right, I know it’s art,” [be]cause 
they’ve been told, oh yes, you have to believe that it’s art. I still think that 
sincerely the appreciation of it is limited. There’s exceptions, [be]cause 
some people really like photography. But . . . some of those exceptions are 
people that like photography [be]cause they like to like go to the lake and 
shoot photographs, and that’s really not what professional . . . art 
photographers do anyway. They’re not going to a beautiful place to make 
beautiful pictures. So then the people are like, “Ooh, I love photography,” 
you know, “I, I love to take pictures when I–,” and I sound like I’m being 
dismissive of them, I’m not, but their understanding of it is not really any 
better than people who don’t appreciate it as an art form, [be]cause I 
actually think what art photographers are doing is much more complicated 
than many people can see.50 
There will be more to say below about the complexity of photography and the skill 
and labor involved in making photographs in the way Sarah describes. Here, the 
point is that Sarah draws a distinction between photographers and photographs along 
the lines of professionalization, skill and practice. This focuses the Burrow-Giles 
copyright hierarchy on the worker (the photographer) not the work (the 
photograph). 
A commercial photographer based in New York, when answering a question 
about relationships between photographers and their assistants regarding 
authorship and ownership of the photograph, mirrors Burrow-Giles’s concept about 
photographers as directors superintending the photographic composition. She 
explains here. 
There are instances where an assistant might press the button for the 
photographer, where the photographer has directed everything to that 
point, and they might make their assistant sign that [work for hire] 
agreement . . . . I personally never had a problem with that concept 
because I think taking pictures isn’t just about pushing a button. It’s about 
all the stuff that happens beforehand, . . . if I was handicapped and I 
 
49. Interview with Sarah Newman, supra note 41, at 19. 
50. Id. at 60–61. 
First to Printer_Silbey (1) (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  1:43 PM 
2019] JUSTIFYING COPYRIGHT 417 
couldn’t push the button, and I directed a technician to push the button 
for me, it is still my photo, it’s how I see that thing.51 
In fact, most photographers shared some version of the “photographer as 
director” concept.52 The photographer is not only the actuator of the image, but 
produces an intended or deliberate vision. From the newest and most digitally native 
photographers to the most experienced and celebrated, some who still work only in 
film, photographers describe what they do as unique and notable. They focus on 
what they do with cameras, not on the products of picture taking.53 
Lee Crosson and Ali Campbell are young photographers with substantial time 
and experience making photographs and with aspirations to eventually make a living 
doing so full-time. Both are world travelers and use their photography to share those 
travels with others. To both Lee and Ali, the diverse beauty of the world and its 
vastness is one of the challenges of being a photographer. Lee says that he thinks 
often how “a photographer’s job is to crop the world, and prioritize . . . a certain 
set of images or an image in what is an infinite degree of, or an infinite number of 
perspectives, . . . it’s more what a photographer leaves out than what they 
include.”54 Ali offers a similar account that is more overtly political. As she says 
below, she worries about the lack of visual literacy in context of the accumulation 
of photographs on the Internet and the unspoken cultural forces that shape what 
we see and what we don’t see in photographs. 
[T]here’s this crazy proliferation of visual media, and I think a lot of people 
have this kind of antagonism, where it’s like, “This is a photographer,” 
“This is not a photographer,” and for me, . . . I think it’s really good for 
people to be creating, I think by and large, . . . photography is such a 
fantastic thing, [be]cause it encourages people to notice other things 
around them . . . that we’re trained not to, right? Like everyone’s constantly 
on their phone, constantly listening to music, [so] there’s not this 
propensity to . . . [think], “That’s really beautiful, I wanna take a picture of 
that.” I think it’s really nice that [the availability of cameras] gives people 
an automatic mechanism for doing that. I do think as well [that] . . . we 
don’t have much visual literacy . . . [in] understanding what photos 
mean, . . . how they’re taken, or how to interact with them.55 
Ali draws a distinction between taking photographs, as most of us do, and 
making photographs, which is how all the photographers I interviewed characterized 
 
51. Interview with “Esther” in N.Y.C., N.Y., Tr. at 6 (Sept. 22, 2017). Some of the 
photographers we interviewed requested anonymity, which is why this photographer is given a 
pseudonym. 
52. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 61 (describing photographic authors as “superintend[ing] the 
arrangement . . . form[ing] the picture”); see also HIRSCH, supra note 27, at 88 (describing Napoleon 
Sarony as a “modern-day director”). 
53. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 67 (2015) (analyzing more diversely stratified data and drawing a similar 
conclusion). 
54. Interview with Lee Crosson in Arrowsic, Me., Tr. at 11 (Dec. 24, 2016). 
55. Interview with Ali Campbell in Bos., Mass., Tr. at 20–21 (Feb. 4, 2017). 
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their practice. When a photographer makes a photograph, they deliberately render 
the image from a particular perspective, with particular tools, making choices about 
composition and arrangement. This is the Burrow-Giles story, identifying the origin 
of the photograph as the photographer and not the machine or nature. It also tracks 
Ali’s story in the above quote where she distinguishes photographs made by artists 
(“This is a photographer”) from those taken by amateurs (“This is not a 
photographer”).56 
When Ali’s says her account as described above is less “antagonis[tic]”—less 
hierarchical in her view of what makes someone a photographer—she appears to 
embrace the possibility for other people who may not be considered 
“photographers” to experience unappreciated beauty around them and document 
it. But then she also below describes the ethical implications “photographers” 
should consider when making pictures because the proliferation of picture-taking 
renders “ordinary” the resulting images that circulate so easily today. 
[W]e get so much of our information and so many of our views about the 
world around us . . . predicated upon the images that we see . . . that comes 
from a certain perspective, and . . . there’s motives behind how this 
information and this knowledge is produced. I think it’s the same way with 
photos, right? . . . [T]here’s not this kind of understanding that this means 
something, [that] I should be critical of this, or [that] I should understand 
this in a certain way . . . . [W]hen people take images[,] . . . frame it their 
particular way, . . . put seven filters on it, and share it [with] . . . particular 
captions and hashtags and things like that, I think people can do it in their 
own right, but I don’t think they necessarily have the same understanding 
of, “This is what others are doing, . . . ?” [They think] “This is my own 
feed,” and then looking at others, [they’re not thinking] “they’re going 
through the same process, I get this,” . . . for so many this is especially [the 
case with] photojournalism and news photography, but I think people 
don’t necessarily understand the link between “OK I’m going out, and I’m 
taking a picture of my coffee,” . . . and [connecting that to] “what is the 
relationship between that process and then what’s happening in Syria,” or 
“what’s happening in this other part of the world,” right? [H]ow are those 
parallel, and, . . . you know, you’re making choices about what you’re 
sharing . . . . There’s just so much horrific content out there, and I think 
so much of it is click bait, and people are like, “atrocity footage to share,” 
[or] “Terrible news story to share” . . . and . . . obviously, there’s really 
horrific things that are going on, that we have to . . . grapple with, and fight 
against, but also I think culturally, we think in such binary terms, . . . 
“Everything is awful now,” or “Everything is good now,” and that’s not 
how the world functions, right? [T]here’s nuance in everything.57 
For Ali, the photographer’s task communicates that nuance and shares 
responsibility for it. Lee confirms that goal in his explanation of the selectivity of 
 
56. Id. at 20. 
57. Id. at 22–23. 
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each photograph in “crop[ping] the world.”58 Making photographs focuses the 
photographer’s attention (and hopefully its audiences) on the many ways that images 
can be rendered to shift or make new understandings. To these photographers, 
making photographs is not “mere[ly] mechanical” but is part of a larger 
conversation they are having with and about their world.59 Being a photographer 
has an ethical component one learns through concerted practice over time. 
The conflict animating the photographers’ accounts of “originality” does not 
yet justify the right to prevent copying their photographs. But it explains how they 
add value to culture. Like the reasoning in Burrow-Giles, these photographers draw 
distinctions between copyrightable photographs and ordinary ones based upon  
pre-shutter activity and the skill and experience a photographer incorporates when 
making photographs from the surrounding world. Notably, the antagonist in the 
Burrow-Giles story is not the pirate who copies without asking to rob the artists of 
expected income, but the machine that minimizes human input and individualized 
reflection. By contrast, contemporary photographers embrace their machines and 
are not threatened by their availability. But these photographers do worry that the 
ubiquity of photographs and photographic equipment may dull the effect of the 
nuanced, novel, and critical perspectives that photographers work hard to produce 
to benefit cultural diversity and critique. 
Burrow-Giles’ open question about copyright protection and automated image-
making (“ordinary” photographs) narrows the holding to photographers who, like 
Sarony, are extraordinary in their fame and artistry. Contemporary photographers 
are not likely to accept the logical end of this argument: that some photographs 
produced by photographers are left unprotected. Photographers appear to consider 
creative choice as inherent in the act of making pictures even if the weight of the 
photographers’ accounts focuses on connecting skill, experience, and developing 
artistry with the protection of a photographer’s output. The problem of “ordinary” 
photographs is not their lack of authorship, but the imperceptibility of their creative 
and expressive aspects in light of the over-determined perception of their depiction 
of reality. When photographic skills of rendering become invisible, as they are in 
ordinary photographs, audiences become uncritical. 
Like Burrow-Giles, contemporary photographers appear to privilege the 
original photograph over the ordinary one for its stimulating effects and its 
reflection of skill and expertise. But this doesn’t explain photographers’ unilateral 
protection of all photographs. In fact, most photographers consider a third-party’s 
desire to reuse, reproduce, and further distribute even an “ordinary” photograph in 
its original form sufficient evidence of its originality and value and thus its 
protectability.60 In other words, verbatim copying is a per se copyright infraction. 
This is a version of the “if value, then right” argument that copyright law generally 
 
58. Interview with Lee Crosson, supra note 54. 
59. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). 
60. See discussion infra Section II.B.1. 
First to Printer_Silbey (1) (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  1:43 PM 
420 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:405 
rejects in light of fair use and extensive statutory limitations.61 And yet, in Bleistein 
v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., the Court relies on a version of this argument to 
dispose of the aesthetic hierarchy around which the logic of Burrow-Giles revolves 
to dramatically expand copyright protection.62 Despite Bleistein’s synergies with 
contemporary photographers’ explanation of aesthetic value, Bleistein’s 
simultaneous flattening of the originality standard and broadening of copyright 
eligibility disrupts contemporary photographers’ accounts of artistry and skill as the 
defining contours of their profession on which a market for their work depends.63 
II. BLEISTEIN V. DONALDSON LITHOGRAPHIC CO. AND COPYRIGHT AS 
CURRENCY 
As in Burrow-Giles, the Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co. Court faced the 
expansion of copyright subject matter as a result of technological evolution. Bleistein 
concerned a dispute between competing copiers: Bleistein, the president of Courier 
Lithographic Company who designed and mass-produced the circus advertisements 
in question for Great Wallace Shows, and Donaldson Lithographic Company, who 
made further copies of the same posters.64 Mass produced advertisements, such as 
those for circuses, did not obviously promote progress of science and the useful 
arts. And the business of mass-reproduction, like lithography, was sufficiently 
competitive to question the need for copyright incentives to promote the business 
further.65 And yet the story the case tells was not the role of copyright in battle over 
marginal pricing of copyrightable goods, or even the benefits of such competition 
for contemporary consumers. It is the democratization of authorship and rejection 
of copyright elitism in the age of diversifying tastes at the dawn of the twentieth 
century. 
A. Leveling Copyright for the Crowd 
Bleistein could have been a story about the virtue of first in time: the Courier 
Lithography Co. (the plaintiff) first made and reproduced the circus 
advertisements.66 Donaldson is the second-comer, trading on the first-mover’s 
investment in design and engraving. This could have been a story about investment-
backed expectations and priority, a familiar justification for property rights 
balancing respect for initiators with the importance of fair competition to a 
diversified and affordable marketplace.67 Instead, the Court’s account of the dispute 
 
61. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 
65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990). 
62. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
63. See infra Section III. 
64. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248–49. 
65. Id. at 249. 
66. Id. at 248. 
67. Lawrence Berger, Analysis of the Doctrine That “First in Time, Is First in Right,” 64  
NEB. L. REV. 349 (1985). 
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between the two lithography companies turns on the question of whether copyright 
law was ever intended to protect “tawdry pictures” or “mere advertis[ing]” given 
the constitutional prerogative of promoting the “progress of science and the useful 
arts.”68 
The Court concluded by extending the privilege of copyright to advertising 
content and refusing to limit copyright to illustrations connected with the fine arts.69 
First, the Court extends Burrow-Giles’ reasoning about the central role of rendition, 
intentionality, and personality for copyright protection: 
[T]he plaintiffs’ case is not affected by the fact . . . that the pictures 
represent actual groups . . . [and may have been] drawn from . . . life . . . . 
Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the  
copy. . . . The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature. 
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its 
singularity . . . and a very modest grade of art has in it something 
irreducible, which is one man’s alone . . . . There is no reason to doubt that 
these prints in their ensemble and in all their details, in their design and 
particular combinations of figures, lines, and colors, are the original work 
of the plaintiffs’ designer.70 
As in Burrow-Giles, creating new images based on real people in the world does 
not bar copyright protection. Copyright authors make “copies” of the world 
embodying their “personal reaction . . . upon nature,” which “always contains 
something unique.”71 Whether the authored copy is a photograph or an illustration, 
if the author is reacting to the natural world and not to another copyrighted work, 
the copy will always contain “something irreducible, which is one man’s alone” and 
thus protectable as “original” under copyright law.72 Bleistein thus extends Burrow-
Giles’ originality standard by implying that any human reaction upon nature will be 
original because personality is distinctive. This includes not only those intentional 
renditions, such as Sarony’s photographic portrait, but arguably anything labeled 
“art” made by humans, such as the circus illustrations.73 
Second, the Court responded to defendant’s argument that the 
advertisements, even if original, are of insufficient “artistic merit, . . . value and 
usefulness to be entitled to copyright.”74 Whereas the first argument responds to 
the scope of originality, this second argument is constitutionally grounded in the 
meaning of “progress of science and the useful arts.”75 Although Justice Holmes 
 
68. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 249–50. 
71. Id. at 250. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 244 (defendant’s argument in Bleistein preceding the opinion in the U.S. Reports). 
75. See Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of American 
Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 330 (2017) (offering a revised account of Bleistein as 
disconnecting the low originality standard in the name of personality from the importance of aesthetic 
neutrality to promote commercial markets, the latter of which has become the measure of progress). 
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does not cite Burrow-Giles’ distinction between copyrighted works and “ordinary” 
productions, he refutes the contention that “ordinary posters are not good enough 
to be considered” within copyright protection.76 Ordinary posters in this situation 
refer to advertisements and other illustrations unconnected to the fine arts. The 
dissent echoes the defendant’s position that the popular and consumer-oriented 
nature of the work—its function as an advertisement—prevents it from being 
“promotive of the useful arts, within the meaning of the constitutional provision.”77 
But Holmes, writing for the majority, disagrees. 
Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their 
pictorial quality attracts the crowd, and therefore gives them a real use,—
if use means to increase trade and to help make money. A picture is none 
the less a picture, and none the less a subject of copyright, that it is used 
for an advertisement . . . . It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth 
of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. 
At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation . . . . At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures 
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they 
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,—it 
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational 
value,—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt . . . . 
That these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown 
by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights.78 
The anti-hierarchical and populist sentiment in this passage is laudable in 
principle.79 It reflects the reasoning of Holmes’ famous dissent two years later in 
Lochner v. New York, in which he castigates the Court majority for striking down 
New York’s fair labor laws on the basis of a policy disagreement with the New York 
legislature.80 There, Holmes argued that when a reasonable disagreement exists 
concerning the judiciousness of legislative line drawing, judges should defer to the 
democratic process absent a clear violation of the Constitution.81 In Lochner, Justice 
Holmes wrote the following. 
It is settled . . . that . . . state laws may regulate life in many ways which 
we . . . might think as injudicious . . . . Some of these laws embody 
convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. Some may  
not. But a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to 
the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing 
 
76. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added). 
77. Bleistein, 118 U.S. at 252 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. at 251–52 (majority opinion). 
79. As Barton Beebe writes, it is also a “tendentious” finesse of the statutory language approved 
by a democratic majority in Congress that confines copyright to “pictorial illustrations or works 
connected to the fine arts.” Beebe, supra note 75, at 363. 
80. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64–65 (1905). 
81. Id. 
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views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar, 
or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon 
the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States.82 
Holmes’ dissent in Lochner is famous for its judicial humility: legislatures 
(democratic government) not judges should decide questions of policy.83 At a time 
when judges (especially Supreme Court justices) struck down welfare-enhancing 
laws further distancing elite judges from the people the laws govern, Holmes 
resisted this tact and infused his decisions with democratic principles, including 
those about copyright.84 In Bleistein, Holmes stretches the meaning of the copyright 
statute covering “only pictorial illustrations or works connected with the fine arts” 
to reach circus advertisements.85 He does so apparently to honor everyday, common 
creations and their authors as promoting the constitutional progress prerogative.86 
Together, Holmes’ opinion in Bleistein and his dissent two years later in Lochner 
celebrate the role democratic majorities play in regulating everyday life at the 
expense of judicial authority.87 In Bleistein, “ordinary” illustrations should not be 
deprived copyright status precisely when (and perhaps also because) “they 
command the interest of any public,” and especially not in this case when “their 
success [was] shown by the desire to reproduce them” thousands of times.88 Holmes 
declares that “progress” according to the Constitution’s intellectual property power 
should be interpreted flexibly to reflect the will of the people.89 In Bleistein, the 
people’s will was reflected in market preferences and Holmes’ broad statutory 
construction.90 In the age of mechanical reproduction with cutthroat competition 
for copying services and when mass-production threatens to erase individuation, 
democratic decision-making and populism characterize the hero and elitist judges 
are untrustworthy antagonists. This is declared against idealistic background 
assumptions of a functioning democracy responsive to unfair labor practices 
 
82. Id. at 75–76. 
83. See, e.g., Rebecca Brown, The Art of Reading Lochner, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 570, 573 
(2005). 
84. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting), with Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250–51 (1903) (Holmes, J., writing for the majority). 
85. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (in citing relevance of Act of 1874, ch. 301, c. 3, noting that “‘in 
the construction of this act, the words ‘engraving,’ ‘cut,’ and ‘print’ shall be applied only to pictorial 
illustrations or works connected with the fine arts.’”); see also Beebe, supra note 75, at 363 (“Present-day 
accounts of Bleistein . . . celebrate his declaration later in the opinion that judges should not impose 
their own aesthetic standards when deciding copyright cases, but they omit the fact that this is precisely 
what he did in his highly tendentious statutory interpretation.”). 
86. Beebe points to the irony of Holmes’ deference to legislative judgment at the same time as 
he appears to be rewriting through broad interpretation the provision of the Copyright Act at issue. See 
Beebe, supra note 75, at 363. 
87. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), with Bleistein, 188  
U.S. at 250–51 (Holmes, J., writing for the majority). 
88. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 252. 
89. Id. at 251. 
90. Id. at 252 (“[T]he taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.”). 
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(Lochner’s wage statute) and market opportunities for creative work (Bleistein’s 
interpretation of progress guiding copyright law). The photographers in today’s age 
of digital reproduction challenge those assumptions and tell a different story. 
B. Inclusive Authorship, Exclusive Business Practices 
As we will see below, photographers consider non-discriminatory aesthetics 
important for promoting photographic (and other artistic) practices. They agree that 
judges should not be deciding what is worthy of copyright protection as a function 
of beauty, form, or style. As described above, oftentimes making photographs 
reflects specific and unique personal circumstances of each author’s practice. 
Holmes left the judgment of aesthetics to the commercial market by preserving the 
default that copyright covers all minimally creative works. Photographers embrace 
this default by espousing the benefits of business-to-business norms that mandate 
payment for reproduction and distribution as the basis for attributing value to and 
reward for photographic labor, service and works. 
Photographers part company with Bleistein concerning the case’s implication 
for broad copyright infringement liability. This breadth potentially obstructs the 
development of aesthetic practices and with it the virtue of the everyday author’s 
chance to develop personality and distinctiveness. Photographers distinguish 
between three dimensions of photographic practice relevant to Bleistein’s holding 
regarding aesthetic progress and copyright: (1) the creativity of a photograph, which 
they think law has no business assessing, (2) aesthetic borrowing and stylistic 
influencing through practices of resemblance and imitation, which they think the 
law has no business obstructing, and (3) verbatim copying and reuse, which they 
think copyright law is supposed to constrain. 
The first principle accords with Bleistein, the last two remain contentious in 
copyright doctrine today.91 Photographers describe aesthetic borrowing and stylistic 
influences as central to the development of both photographic skill and aesthetics. 
Bleistein does not speak to the scope of copyright protection beyond the dispute 
concerning the reach of fine arts and pictorial illustrations to advertising. But insofar 
as Bleistein establishes broad copyright protection, including of “ordinary posters,” 
it not only protects copyrighted works from exact copying (as was the case in 
Bleistein) but also from being imitated in style or content. Holmes says “others are 
free to copy the original. They are not free to copy the copy,” implying that avoiding 
copyright infringement requires reacting to the original source of inspiration  
(nature and real life) and not to other works of art.92 This poses a problem for 
 
91. As will be discussed, imitation and borrowing even for the purposes of developing skill or 
making other art may be copyright infringement if substantial similar copies or derivative works are 
made and no exception or limitation to copyright infringement applies. Verbatim copying and reuse is 
often copyright infringement, but sometimes it is fair use. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 
202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992). 
92. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249. 
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photographers who demand protection from verbatim copying but refuse or resist 
the idea of copyright liability for works that are influenced by or stylized after other 
works. Making photographs in the style of Ansel Adams or Annie Liebowitz, for 
example, is partly how photographers develop skills critical for professional success. 
Verbatim copies, however, are always copyright violations. Exact copying, reusing 
and distributing the photograph in the way viral reuses of photography occur today 
violates professional norms, inflict harm (they say), and should be actionable under 
copyright law. 
Herein lies a paradox embedded in contemporary photographers’ story of 
creativity and copyright with origins in Bleistein’s democratic principles. On the one 
hand, the photographers describe the importance of a diverse, non-hierarchical 
aesthetic to facilitate the making of creative work by defining “original works of 
authorship” broadly. On the other hand, they tout the importance of professional 
status and promote an alternative hierarchy by distinguishing between 
photographers on the basis of the investment of discipline, time and skill to justify 
an ownership interest that protects economic rights in certain kinds of copying. 
Bleistein’s story of democratized copyright explaining how authorship is open to all 
merges copyright scope (defining “original works of authorship”) with protection 
against infringement (defining “unlawful copying”).93 This conflation may have 
been irrelevant to Bleistein’s reasoning from its facts, explaining why it was left 
unexamined in the decision.94 The photographers, however, insist on a distinction 
precisely to preserve certain hierarchies central to their professional wellbeing. 
Anyone can be an author—even amateur photographers are authors. Developing 
and claiming authorship is a function of distinctiveness in a crowded cultural and 
market-oriented society. But only those uses of photographs to which professional 
photographs are put require payment (e.g., licensed reuses in specified outlets). In 
other words, photographers do not judge the aesthetic merit of photographic 
works—authorship is open to all—but payment for using an exact copy of an 
authored work follows from the observation of professional norms and status. In 
the photographers’ stories, there are masters and apprentices, and one moves from 
one to the other on the basis of market success, as well as skill, practice, and 
reputation. 
Contemporary digital photographs supply two story elements missing in 
Bleistein. One concerns the importance of sustainable work practices, requiring 
freedom to make photographs without restriction on borrowing and stylistic 
influence and regular demand for production. Second is the stability of institutional 
hierarchies defined by investment of time and development of skill (e.g., the 
difference between amateurs and professionals) along with the control professional 
 
93. This is a common elision in intellectual property and subject to much criticism. See Mark  
A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2230–31, 2268 (2016). 
94. Because defendant made exact copies in Bleistein and directly competed with plaintiff’s 
market in those copies, the need to disentangle subject matter (what is protected) from infringement 
liability (how is it protected) was unimportant. 
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status provides (ownership and avoidance of work-for-hire arrangements). The 
photographers insist upon both to sustain their creative autonomy and business 
leverage. Corporate consolidation and the development of distribution platforms 
such as Getty Images or Time Inc. have weakened photographers’ bargaining power 
and destabilized their business models. Declaring all authors equal in view of 
copyright eligibility, and relying on raw commercial value as a measure of progress, 
Holmes missed an opportunity in Bleistein to connect the promotion of creative 
praxis with industrial organization that promotes fairness in labor standards and 
opportunities for capital accumulation for workers.95 To some, this was a mistake 
that dashed the hopes of writing American pragmatist aesthetics into U.S. copyright 
law by privileging “the ‘commercial value’ of works, creative products, aesthetic 
objects” instead of “the ‘personality’ of work, creative practice, aesthetic subjects.”96 
Indeed, contemporary photographers engage this critique without knowing Bleistein 
and its legacy. In their accounts of sustainable photographic practices, they describe 
personality as a feature of aesthetic progress enabled as a matter of authorship, of 
which economic rights are a subset, reserved for those few works that demonstrate 
value in the marketplace as photographs. They also complain about a digitally 
networked culture and marketplace that devalues personhood and labor justice 
under the banner of access and a level playing field. One implication of the 
photographers’ accounts is that the problems and pitfalls of copyright law since 
Bleistein (relating to the “destabilized and overextended”97 originality standard and 
its relation to “progress”) may improve with attention to the condition of capital 
accumulation and industrial transformation affecting the business opportunities and 
aesthetic practices of professional photographers in the age of digital reproduction. 
1. Verbatim Copying 
Professional photographers describe how verbatim copying of their work 
requires permission and payment for two reasons. First, the exact replication of their 
photograph appropriates their identity and distinctive contributions. Second, as an 
embodiment of their efforts, the photograph’s tangible transferability conveys value 
for which payment should be rendered, payment that photographers believe 
necessary to make a living. Facilitating both permission and payment by controlling 
verbatim copying is therefore (to them) essential to the production of skilled 
photography in its diverse forms. Whether or not freelance, the photographers 
describe their creative practice and financial well-being as relying on a functioning 
market in professional photography services and products, with paying customers 
or clients who respect contract and copyright. This requires recognizing 
 
95. This is a curious oversight in Bleistein given Holmes’ Lochner dissent two years later favoring 
labor regulation that benefits workers and would have promoted equality in labor negotiations and the 
fairer distribution of capital based on time and skill. 
96. Beebe, supra note 75, at 351. 
97. Hughes, supra note 12, at 388. 
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professional status, preserving established business norms, and demanding 
conformity in business expectations among newcomers. 
Ashok Sinha is a commercial photographer with a growing fine art practice.98 
Photography as a business is his second career (the first was marketing and sales). 
And yet despite coming to professional photography late, and without formal 
training, his accounts of professional norms and aesthetic practices resonate with 
most of the photographers interviewed. When asked about his reaction to the 
copying of one of his photographs for the purposes of transforming it into another 
medium, for example from photography to painting, he gave the following 
response. 
I’d be like, “Wait a second, . . . you had to get permission from me first, to 
make your work.” Because at the end of the day, even if they’re saying 
they’re not doing it for commercial purposes, it is commercial . . . . [S]o I 
think there has to be some sort of permission there. Just like when I 
photograph something with a picture or painting in it, if I have to 
commercialize that picture, right, I have to get permission from the 
copyright holder. So to me that is, again, I come back to it, that is the most 
important thing is what I have inside of me.99 
Ashok clarifies the norms he hopes guides the practice of reuse: 
I think commercial use, . . . people taking my work[ ] and claiming it to 
their own[,] would bother me the most. That would . . . most . . . annoy 
me, and make me very mad. Whether commercial or non-commercial. 
Simple cheating. [laughs][.] [T]he second thing would be obviously usage, 
like if I were to find an image that was used for something that it was not 
intended for, and I never got compensated for it . . . [b]y that client. [That] 
would really bother me.100 
This explanation articulates three harms of verbatim copying. The first is the 
injury caused by the pirate who copies and sells the image claiming it as his own. 
This most resembles Bleistein’s facts, as the lithography companies were selling the 
same image but only one company was its author and owner.101 This injury 
combines emotional and commercial injuries from unfair competition. The second 
is a breach of contract or trust between photographer and client when services are 
rendered and images licensed for specific purposes and the client reuses the image 
in other venues and fails to pay the extra fees. Although this is a transaction 
anchored by copyright’s exclusivity in the photographic author (with the right to 
transfer that exclusivity for limited purposes to licensees), the injury here is the 
contractual breach based on unauthorized reuse of photographs. The copying per 
se is less what hurts than the fact the client broke its promise to the photographer. 
This is about economic loss too, but the account highlights the offense of 
 
98. Interview with Ashok Sinha in N.Y.C., N.Y. ( July 10, 2017). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 24. 
101. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903). 
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disrespecting an agreement between professionals. The third harm from verbatim 
copying concerns the emotional distress (and not the economic loss) of using a 
photograph without permission. Photographers describe this as an act of erasure 
and also of disrespect. When Sinha emphasizes that “again, I come back to it, that 
is the most important thing is what I have inside of me” he is referring to the creative 
expression embodied in the photograph that represents his personality, which he 
believes should not be appropriated without his permission.102 
As to this last point, the photographers were remarkably consistent. Copyright 
law may be fraught with complexity and inconsistencies, but to them the one sure 
thing copyright accomplishes is connecting the photographer to the photograph. 
Most photographers adhere to this principle even in the context of a photograph to 
which they may not be particularly attached personally, aesthetically or 
commercially, as with event or wedding photography.103 Josh Silk, an event 
photographer in New York, explained it this way: 
Silk: “It’s important [I retain copyright] because it’s just always, it’s the 
school I come from. I come out of that school of thought of like, once you 
create, you created that image. If you weren’t there with your camera, you 
know, making something happen, or documenting that moment, it 
wouldn’t exist. So therefore it becomes that photographer’s image, from 
the second the shutter is pressed.” 
Q: “So is it . . . the symbolic meaning that’s associated with it, or is it for 
practical uses that you want to make with these images[ ] that . . . means 
retaining the copyright is important?” 
Silk: “In the instance of event photography, I think it’s symbolic. It’s just 
what it stands for. I’m not gonna give you this for free, and you can say it’s 
yours. That has . . . not only monetar[y] [value], but [also] has value in 
terms of being the creator, you know? If . . . you’re the creator, that’s what 
being an artist is all about, is being the person that’s creating stuff, and 
when somebody takes your creation and puts their name on it, and says it’s 
their creation, that kinda takes the creator aspect out of the equation, which 
is kind of futile, I guess.”104 
Photographers fight against different forms of erasure: their identities as artists 
embodied in their aesthetic creations; and their labor and investments, as embodied 
in the payment for their time, skill, and photographs. Unauthorized verbatim 
copying involves all of these erasures. 
 
102. Interview with Ashok Sinha, supra note 98. 
103. There was a variation on how photographers sought attribution in the commercial realm. 
Some didn’t want the clients bothering them with permissions in the future, and thus initial contracts 
for services and the photographic license were drafted broadly to cover all future uses of the photograph 
and payment was determined accordingly. In these cases, the photographers still retained their 
copyright, however. Most photographers also still sought attribution for the future uses of photographs, 
although one commercial and portrait photographer said he did not care about attribution for certain 
uses that were strictly corporate. 
104. Interview with Josh Silk, Silk Studios, in N.Y.C., N.Y. ( June 26, 2016). 
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Photographers speak in stark terms about the expectation that payment should 
follow from verbatim uses of their images. One long-time editorial and fine art 
photographer describes the usage of her work as the “unit of currency.”105 She 
explains that when other professionals fail to pay for the use of photographs, for 
example as illustrations in research presentations or in books or articles, it is 
“because [they] do[n’t] come from an industry where you get paid for that kind of 
work. Like that kinda work is just incidental to the profession, whereas in 
photography . . . [it is not] . . . . I think because that was our unit of currency. Usage 
rights are the unit of currency in photography. Not the audience. We . . . want an 
audience, but the ticket to see the show is the usage fee.”106 This same photographer 
elaborates with an analogy to consumer products such as perfume and pie: 
[T]his new generation that grew up on Flickr think that every photograph 
[is for the taking] . . . . As long as you give attribution, and you don’t make 
any money on it . . . . [I]t’s just like you’re a baker, . . . you . . . don’t . . . 
[ever] question [the business model], [but] . . . where photography fits into 
people’s idea, it’s [as if photographs] they’re almost like perfume, like why 
are you wearing that perfume if you don’t want anyone to smell it? Are you 
gonna charge [laughs] me to smell it? It’s just there . . . photography is like 
that . . . . People perceive that of photography, whereas if you’re making 
pies, it’s more like, well, sometimes people make pies to give, and 
sometimes people make pies to sell . . . .107 
Interestingly, this photographer still largely only works with film photography, 
resisting digital photographic practice except for assignments with media companies 
who insist on it. She has such strong feelings about the injury of verbatim copying 
in the digital age, its erasure of physical labor and of the value photographers create 
with their work, that she confines her practice making photographs to material that 
erect physical barriers to mass reproduction that she believes devalues photography 
as a skilled profession. 
Another professional photographer, Lou Jones, has been a photographer since 
the 1970s and maintains a very busy commercial practice with a staff of assistants.108 
He also pursues editorial photography, largely funded by his commercial work.  
He echoes the above-described concern about verbatim copying, specifically 
addressing what he sees as the paradox of non-payment accompanied by a shared 
belief in the photograph’s intrinsic value. Photographs are everywhere, he says, 
implying their desire and need, but price of use has diminished if not evaporated. 
Jones: [Being a photographer in the 1970s] was such a scummy way to 
make a living, but then it changed, you know, the TV, there’s 
photographers . . . for the Sports Illustrated swimsuit thing, there’s 
photographers at National Geographic, . . . it evolved, it was a steady 
 
105. Interview with “Linda” in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 30, 2016). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Interview with Lou Jones in Bos., Mass. (Nov. 10, 2016). 
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evolution, but the photographers started to get a little more of a cachet. 
[But] . . . the thing that nobody talks about, that I continually talk  
about . . . is that we are in an era . . . [when] photography continues to have 
a stranglehold on the premier way of communicating in the world. It is the 
universal language. People do not have to be able to speak your language 
to be able to see a photograph, and to be able to communicate, and we use 
it in every computer, . . . every newspaper, every magazine, every brochure, 
we are inundated with photographs. [I]f somebody has a fire in their 
house, the thing that they’re most wor[ried about is], “we’ve lost all the 
family photographs.” They are being produced at a rate higher than ever 
in history, and nobody wants to pay for them. So that is the bizarre thing 
that changes our industry. Whether it be stock, or commercial, . . . it’s 
purely a[n] economic sea change. 
Q: Yeah. But you still get paid, right? Not to be devil’s advocate, but you 
still can command a price, right? I mean, I’m looking at these pictures. 
These are extraordinary pictures. 
Jones: Rarer and rarer. [It’s] [h]arder and harder to get those clients. And 
the deals we make are . . . less and less, and interesting, yes. We’re making 
[deals that say] “Yes you can use this for this purpose and this purpose, 
and oh, you wanna use it on the internet? Oh, OK, for another hundred 
dollars I’ll let you use it on the internet.” I said, ‘Well you can use it for a 
year.’ [And they say] “No no no, we’ve got our website, it’s gonna be up,” 
you know, “OK, well you can use it, OK, we’ll give you two years. We’ll 
give you three,” you know, . . . It’s like, ugh.109 
Lou Jones describes how photographic contract terms have evolved in the 
internet age to benefit clients but not photographers. These contracts traditionally 
covered day rates (time and labor), equipment and assistants, as well as the limited 
rights to use the photographs in certain outlets for a particular duration. Now, these 
same contracts restrict photography budgets, limiting the use of professional 
equipment and assistants that can distinguish the photographic output, stagnate day 
rates, and demand licenses for the same fee but for almost all uses, including web 
and print and for unlimited time. In these commercial contexts, verbatim copies are 
paid for but their prices have shrunk considerably whereas the labor to produce 
them has not. Here are two examples from commercial photographers describing 
the problematic situation concerning contractual negotiations and the market for 
professional photography arising over verbatim copies. 
Stan Rowin, a commercial photographer in his 60s, who was previously a 
leader of the American Society for Media Photographers (ASMP), describes the 
dynamic of rights depletion he experienced this way: 
That was the first time that Condé Nast came up with a contract that said, 
basically, we can use [the photograph] for whatever we want in perpetuity 
online or in print. That’s the first generation of contract. I gave it to my 
 
109. Id. 
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attorney . . . and he said, “Well, you can’t sign that contract.” I said, “I 
know I can’t sign this contract, but . . . what am I gonna do, call them back 
and say “I can’t do this, I can’t do this, I can’t do this, I can’t do this?” And 
he said, “Yeah. That’s what you’re gonna do. That’s what you paid me for, 
and that’s what you’re gonna do.” So I was dealing with the  
legal department now, as opposed to the art department . . . . [T]hen I  
faxed . . . back the crossed-out things, and I got a phone call back,  
[saying], “I think we can work with you on this.” And I’m saying, “This is 
too . . . odd. There’s somethin’ wrong here.” So [Condé Nast] wrote me a 
new contract, without those terms in it . . . . [R]ight after I signed the 
contract, I never got work from them again.110 
Media clients do and can demand onerous contract terms because of their 
market dominance and industry coordination (in contrast to photographer’s relative 
lack of coordination or unionization as freelancers). In addition to this problem, 
shrinking photography budgets prevent photographers from recuperating revenue 
from fees associated with time, labor and skills. It may seem ironic that in the digital 
age when demand for photographs grows across the multiplying platforms—for 
social media, websites, mailings, buildings, packaging and print—photography 
budgets are not growing and usage fees are not multiplying. In the digital age, 
prioritizing skilled use of equipment and post-production editing (akin to darkroom 
and printing skills in the film era) permits one to distinguish oneself as a 
photographer. Photographers expend this time and labor as a measure of quality 
production, but they struggle to recuperate the costs from the client. 
Carl Tremblay, a Boston-based commercial photographer with a focus on 
food photography, describes the shrinking budgets in relation to lower quality 
photographs: 
You know, because . . . whatever the budget they have, they’ve been 
getting smaller, they wanna make sure they’re gonna get what they want, 
and I think advertising agencies have become mindful of their relationship 
with their clients, the same that we are with them, so they are willing to 
cede a little more control to the client, instead of saying, you know, “You 
hired us. We’re the creative agency.” The digital realm I think has brought 
“I believe that it’s good enough.” You know, there’s so much more content 
out there, and people are satisfied with less, I think. And that directly 
impacts budget[s], and [explains] why [people will] pay less. And I’ve seen 
budgets just decrease and decrease, and . . . once they pay less, why would 
they pay more[ ] for something?111 
Tremblay combines in his account an understanding of how photographers 
lose control over aesthetics in the digital age with the shrinking budgets for 
producing photographic images. He describes a vicious circle: budgets reduce, 
clients are more certain in their demands, control over aesthetics transfer from 
 
110. Interview with Stan Rowin in Bos., Mass. ( June 28, 2016). 
111. Interview with Carl Tremblay in Bos., Mass. (Sept. 8, 2016). 
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photographer or advertising agency to client, the quality and nature of images widen 
as photographers bring less personalized skill and attention to the deliverable 
images. This changes the expectations for photographers’ deliverables (he says 
downgrades) reducing the prices people will pay and further shrinking budgets. 
According to many photographers, despite digital consumption of images 
growing in volume and pace, the photographers’ time, labor and equipment costs 
have not appreciably decreased and in some aspects have actually increased with the 
need to edit and curate so many more digital images. Thus, in bespoke negotiations 
over session fees, day rates, usage fees and production costs, with budgets shrinking 
and clients demanding more usage, photographers’ fees shrink relative to the costs 
associated with production, resulting in an apparent devaluation of each unit (the 
photograph) that the photographers’ licenses. Some photographers call it a 
downward spiral, whereas others, like Tremblay, describe the problem as a vicious 
circle. Whatever the causal relationships between revenue, image quality, volume of 
images produced, and consumption across multiplying platforms, photographers 
experience waning leverage in these one-to-one negotiation with clients. Moreover, 
the copyright dimension of this leverage—the fact they retain copyright and can 
relicense the use of the photograph in the future if the copyright transfer is not 
overly broad—remains insufficient to protect photographers against the shrinking 
budgets despite growing demands. 
These accounts distinguish various forms of value: making photographs for a 
client (a bespoke service dependent on skill and experience), the role of photographs 
in culture, and photographers’ individual authorship. According to the 
photographers, copyright and contract are the mechanisms by which these values 
are recognized and protected, albeit in loosely understood legal terms. Copyright 
anchors the contract for services and output, which memorializes the agreement 
between professional service and client and is dependent on mutual respect and the 
assumption of dedication to task and payment. Copyright also enables the 
photographer to demand attribution and a leveraged price for services and 
outcomes. In significant ways, this comports with the stories of broad authorship 
(e.g., the low originality standard) in both Burrow-Giles and Bleistein—any 
photograph can be the subject of copyright and contract—and also of Bleistein’s 
description of “progress” as determined by evidence of and facilitating more 
commercial exchanges.112 But in the context of rapid technological change, 
photographers tell a story of depleted professional opportunities, ubiquitous 
verbatim copying, and onerous contract terms all threatening their photographic 
practices. In contrast with Bleistein’s story of commercial exchange promoting 
aesthetic progress told against the backdrop of democratically enacted market 
regulation, the photographers describe monopolistic and anti-competitive corporate 
practices that thwart opportunities for diverse market entrants and varied aesthetic 
output. Technological evolution has increased access to the means of production, 
 
112. See supra Sections I.A. (Burrow-Giles), II.A (Bleistein). 
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but copyright law is not necessarily consistent with fair labor regulation, despite its 
roots in Bleistein’s anti-hierarchy sentiment of access and opportunity. 
2. Neither Ordinary Photographers nor Ordinary Photographs 
While embracing broad authorship potential, photographers nonetheless 
prioritize professionally made photographs in terms of economic privilege and 
aesthetic value. Recall the distinction between “ordinary” photographs in Burrow-
Giles (left unprotected) and works in Bleistein that “always contains something 
unique” as “personal reaction[s] of an individual upon nature.”113 Contemporary 
photographers distinguish between these two kinds of authored works in terms of 
professional status and investment of time and development of skill. They do not 
deny the importance of ordinary photographs made by unintentional authors to 
everyday behavior and communication. These are authored works. But they reject 
Bleistein’s anti-hierarchical principle barring aesthetic discrimination in order to 
protect a class of professional artists, the demand for their services, and the 
photographic skills they develop. 
Consider Lee Crosson again, an aspiring photographer who is developing his 
skills and would like someday to make money from his photography work. He says 
[i]t would be really nice to be able to make a little bit of scratch from it, to 
help . . . further travel really more than anything else, but how to do that, I 
haven’t really found a way that’s comfortable at this point . . . . There’re a 
lot of photographers out there right now. And the definition of a 
photographer is a complex one . . . when everyone is walking around with 
a camera in their pocket . . . . I think . . . some of my discomfort with 
attempting to make money at it, when I have tried to, is that I . . . have not 
invested myself appropriately in order to call myself a photographer, and 
therefore I don’t feel like I have the right yet. I haven’t gone through the 
trials that . . . the professional photographers that I know have gone 
through . . . . [M]ost of the photographers that I know, for instance, all 
came up with film photography, so hearing them talking about the amount 
of hours that they spend, . . . the amount of money that they’ve spent on 
film, . . . the failures, and . . . getting back home with a roll of film that 
they were so excited about, and . . . in one way or another, that feeling of 
loss, and having digital come along, and suddenly . . . having infinity . . . at 
your fingers, but also seeing the transition, the change of that, and seeing 
their work that they had worked so hard to craft suddenly being right up 
against people who are just taking a phone out of their pocket, and clickin’ 
somethin’, and maybe getting lucky, maybe not, maybe having a great eye, 
maybe, maybe not. I feel like just the definition of a photographer . . . [is] 
a complex one. Even beyond the analog versus digital [distinction], I 
think . . . it takes time to do anything. Like you [have to] . . . be in 
something for a while in order to figure yourself out, in order to figure the 
 
113. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903). 
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craft out, in order to figure the market out, [and] in order to figure . . . the 
community [out]. And I just don’t feel like I’ve been in it long enough.114 
Contrast Lee’s comment with Rick Friedman, a long-time freelance 
photojournalist based in Boston, who says 
[p]eople seem to have a lot less respect for a photograph, ‘cause everybody 
runs around with their iPhone and does it . . . . I’ve actually had people say 
this to me, “I don’t see what the big deal is. It’s only a photograph.” I’ve 
actually had people say that to me. And I have also had people say to me, 
when we’ve done a job, “Well your pictures seem to come out better than 
our staff photographer.” Actually, we shot a job at a hospital. And the head 
[of] communications called me and said, “Your pictures look a lot better 
than our staff photographer’s. Can you explain to him how you do it?” 
And I said, “I teach workshops. Would love to have him come to one of 
my workshops. But I’m not gonna get on the phone.”115 
Friedman relayed this story with some sarcasm and incredulity. Why was it so 
surprising to the client that the result of the in-house photography shoot was not as 
impressive as the one done by the professional photographer with decades of 
experience? And why does the client think this skill and expertise can be taught with 
an explanation rather than years of training? Friedman directed his client to some 
of the professional development seminars he conducts for established 
photographers as well as introductory classes for hopeful photographers. He 
believes in the importance of teaching aesthetic and business skills—he says 
teaching “forces him to be a better photographer.”116 And he is successful at both. 
He sustains a busy freelance photography business in an increasingly competitive 
marketplace for photographers driven by cheap camera equipment, the ease of 
photographic reproduction, and the consolidation of media companies, which leads 
to diminished fees for freelancers. Despite the growing marketplace competition, 
Friedman distinguishes himself and generates demand for his professional work 
because his photographs evidence his substantial experience in the field and 
advanced skills. As an experienced photographer, Friedman commands high prices 
for his time and photographs. 
Another professional photographer describes the importance of teaching the 
difference between good pictures and “terrific pictures” especially in the digital age 
when anyone can take pictures with their phone.117 Felice Frankel is a science 
photographer, in the vein of Berenice Abbott and Harold “Doc” Edgerton, all of 
whom explored the physical world unavailable to ordinary vision but made visible 
through photography.118 Frankel’s photographs, like those of Abbott and Edgerton 
 
114. Interview with Lee Crosson, supra note 54. 
115. Interview with Rick Friedman in Bos., Mass. (Sept. 12, 2016). 
116. Id. 
117. Interview with Felice Frankel in Bos., Mass. ( June 23, 2016). 
118. HAROLD EDGERTON, EXPLORING THE ART AND SCIENCE OF STOPPING TIME ( James 
Sheldon ed., 1999). 
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before her, are mysterious for their revelation of the physical world unavailable to 
the naked eye and are stunning in their beauty.119 She also worries about accuracy, 
staying true to the science she is picturing with her camera, similar to how 
photojournalists worry about staying true to the events and the people whose lives 
are being represented.120 Frankel’s interest in digital photography given easy access 
to cameras is to preserve the integrity of information conveyed through 
photographs by developing the skills and awareness of those who make and share 
pictures with digital equipment. This not only distinguishes the photographer, but 
also the quality of the photograph. She says 
I’m now making pictures on my phone . . . because . . . what it does  
is it takes three pictures, of different exposures, and puts them  
together . . . . And so I now see that making pictures is democratic, you 
know? But . . . what I’d like to think is that [pause] you could tell the 
difference between a good picture, a good-enough picture[,] and a terrific 
picture. I mean, that’s why I’m making this book. I want to raise the 
standards of what should be demanded . . . of images.”121 
These accounts imply that audiences distinguish between ordinary and stylized 
photographs but do not appreciate the distinction as rooted in experience and skill. 
By contrast, photographers assess skill and quality as part of their professional 
practice. Attending to the process of making photographs—the particular skills, the 
hard work, and time—is one way photographers help clients and audiences 
appreciate professional photographers’ contributions to visual culture and mass 
communication. 
Photographers describe a range of activities and skills that generate aesthetic 
style and distinctiveness. Accounts of their photographic practice do not starkly 
oppose professional and amateur, or stylized and ordinary, but implicit in the 
accounts is a hierarchy built around these conceptual binaries that justifies market 
privileges. Here are two such accounts, one from Mark Ostow, a long-time 
professional photographer with a specialty in portraits and editorial, who also works 
in the general commercial space, and the other from Kim Lorraine, a photographer 
on the verge of opening her own portrait studio, who has been moonlighting as a 
photographer on the edges of her day-job for nearly a decade. 
Ostow describes his stylistic distinctiveness in terms of his use of light and 
work with assistants, all of which has been honed over three decades in his own 
full-time professional photography practice. He answers a question about how with 
digital equipment he maintains an edge in the profession: 
[Digital camera technology] . . . allow[ed] me to do this project [on 2016 
presidential candidates], which meant that we could move the light 
 
119. See generally JULIA VAN HAAFTEN, BERENICE ABBOTT: A LIFE IN PHOTOGRAPHY (2018); 
FELICE FRANKEL, https://www.felicefrankel.com/ [https://perma.cc/FXZ3-GZRH] ( last visited 
Jan. 18, 2019). 
120. Interview with Felice Frankel, supra note 117. 
121. Id. 
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constantly. I could . . . make something on the fly, . . . a mixture of 
photojournalism and portraiture. I think I came up with this . . . hybrid 
thing. And I’m the only person at these events who has an assistant with 
them, so . . . there were . . . all the other press photographers with all their 
lenses and two cameras, and vests, [and] they’re all like, “I keep seeing this 
guy. What is he doing?” And . . . I’m like “Anna, Over there. There! 
There!” And then Hillary [Clinton] turns and . . . I think [my use of light 
is] unusual. [Bec]ause most people are using light [that] comes from the 
camera[ ] or they’re using available light in these situations, but I was trying 
to create a portrait version of reportage. So I wasn’t reporting on the event, 
I . . . felt that they had to come up with something that captures someone 
speaking in . . . New Hampshire, and I’m like “I’ll do whatever the fuck I 
want.”122 
As compared to working with assistants, hand-held lighting, and blending 
photographic genres—all of which rely on depth of technical, aesthetic and 
managerial experiences—Kim Lorraine describes the substantial effort she expends 
on post-shutter activity editing and curating photographs from a portrait sitting to 
distinguish her style and add value to her work. 
[A]fter the photo shoot, [I am] left with probably . . . two to four hundred 
pictures, and [I] have to weed through those pictures to find the best 
pictures. And after [I] weed through those pictures . . . I hand edit every 
single picture . . . . And that can take anywhere between ten seconds  
to three minutes, depending on what it is, and what I’m trying to  
create . . . it’s saturation, it’s colors, it’s contrast, it’s clarity, it’s shadows, 
it’s highlights, . . . I use Lightroom and Photoshop. Everything goes in 
Lightroom first, and then if I have to remove [something from] a really 
nice picture, [like] . . . a garbage can, I will [do so]. Or like [if] someone 
walked . . . into the frame[ ] and I can’t crop them out, I will remove the 
person.123 
Kim Lorraine’s explanation of her post-shutter work parallels the developing 
and printing processes from pre-digital days. Mark Ostow’s description of lighting 
and angle in contemporary photojournalism is also a hybrid of traditional practices 
with digital technology.124 Both draw on practice experiences and skill development 
to explain aesthetic value. 
Many contemporary photographers who began their careers in film describe 
nostalgia for the darkroom. It is meditative work as compared to the energetic 
frenzy of shooting photographs in the world. Also, in the darkroom (or now when 
using the computer program Lightroom), photographers can acutely focus on 
detailed aesthetic qualities of the images they are making. In both settings—in front 
of their computer or in the darkroom—photographers describe the need for 
 
122. Interview with Mark Ostow in Arlington, Mass. ( June 16, 2016). 
123. Interview with Kim Lorraine in N.Y.C., N.Y. ( June 22, 2016). 
124. See MARK OSTOW PHOTOGRAPHY, https://www.ostow.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
D2S6-8HM2] ( last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
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intensity of focus, practiced handicraft, and considerable time. More will be said 
below in Part III about the centrality of hard work (“sweat of the brow”) to 
photographers’ identification of value as represented through payment and credit. 
Here, the point is that time and labor, as essential to developing expertise, 
distinguish the professional from amateur photographer and the stylized from the 
ordinary photograph. Burrow-Giles implies this distinction given the relevance of the 
fame of the plaintiff to his victory and the narrowing of the holding to composed 
photographs.125 Bleistein elides this distinction in terms of its leveling of authorship 
and reducing all aesthetic progress to evidence of commercial exchange.126 As I 
discuss below, photographers accept the former account of authorship, when 
authorship and attendant ownership does not obstruct other authors from pursuing 
their practice. Photographers resist the commercial account of aesthetic progress 
when, as described above, it interferes with maintaining professional business 
standards, including fair pay for skilled professional work. But, as we’ll see below, 
they also resist Bleistein’s commercial account by assuming a more flexible 
infringement standard that is largely limited to verbatim or substantially similar 
copying. 
3. Creative Freedom and Sustainable Photography Practice 
Most photographers I interviewed insisted on payment for verbatim copies of 
their photographs. But these professional photographers also accepted as part of 
photographic practice, aesthetic development, and mass communication that 
photographs will be used or repurposed as part of artistic and communicative 
norms. Sometimes, contemporary photographers begrudgingly admitted that 
copying may be an uncomfortable necessity in the on-going conversation that relies 
on diverse artistic practices. Other times, they described being flattered by copying 
of their work when it promoted conversations not only about the subject matter of 
the photograph but photography itself. Note that it is photographers or other 
authors who make these kinds of tolerated but unauthorized copies of photographs. 
It is not clients, from whom payment is expected according to business norms. 
The two examples immediately below display broad copying tolerances 
outside the ambit of verbatim copying (for which photographers usually expect to 
be paid) and that are perceived to promote creative freedoms and sustainable 
photographic practice. These accounts demonstrate more flexibility than copyright 
law allows, describing situations that resemble derivative uses for which copyright 
law would require permission and payment. By contrast, the last two examples 
demonstrate less flexibility insofar as the photographers describe critical or 
transformative reuses that copyright fair use would exempt but over which the 
photographers nonetheless seek control. 
 
125. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). 
126. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
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Ashok explains his tolerance for others copying his work in certain 
circumstances. And like others, he doesn’t track how his photographs travel over 
the internet. He doesn’t use reverse image search or services to find unauthorized 
uses of his work. But of the few uses he did find by accident, he says 
there’s only a couple of instances I came [across where] I kinda felt a little 
flattered . . . . [T]hey were good artists . . . they took one image of mine . . . 
said they were inspired by this image, . . . and they took some other 
image, . . . and I’m like, “All right . . . they’re not selling it per se.”127 
From his description of this reuse, his initial photograph was used as inspiration 
and as raw material for a new work, although his photograph was recognizable as a 
component part.128 This practice made sense to him as an artist and he considered 
the use of his photograph complimentary. 
Lee Crosson explains that the unauthorized part of unauthorized copying is 
crucial to making art, and this is why one must be flexible when it comes to 
controlling copying. He says 
I think it’s a question of intent . . . . What is the person trying to  
do . . . ? In [the] case [of a student using a photograph in a PowerPoint 
presentation], I would have no problem at all. That would flatter me  
and nothing else . . . . The thing is that it’s not even just making the  
money. . . . I actually support this . . . [The unauthorized use and the 
discomfort with it] needs to be there. That’s the art. Like we’re saying, this 
is a conversation that needed to happen, and I think this is really the only 
way that it would’ve happened. 
Q: So what if [the copier] had asked permission and the photographer had 
said no, and then he went ahead and did it anyway? 
Crosson: I think it would make it more powerful art. You know. I wouldn’t 
wanna be that person. But it would make it more powerful art . . . . I don’t 
know what I would say [if asked]. But that would destroy it. . . . the 
conversation goes away . . . . F. Scott Fitzgerald has this great quote that I 
return to time and time again . . . : “The test of a first-rate intelligence is 
the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still 
retain the ability to function.” And I think that’s got applications 
everywhere. So . . . OK, I think it’s almost necessary to be pissed about this 
[unauthorized copying], but . . . at the same time . . . I want to be able to 
say what I want to say, and when I want to say it, and this is a consequence 
of it, you know. And the law, . . . is it’s impossible for that to be made 
around one single person, and that is essentially the expectation you’re 
saying, like, “I don’t want this to happen to me,” but the implications of 
 
127. Interview with Ashok Sinha, supra note 98. 
128. See generally Andrew Gilden, Raw Materials and the Creative Process, 104 GEO. L.J. 355, 
368–69 (2016) (discussing how transformative standard will allow a “preexisting image” to be 
considered “component” when “used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new” art). 
First to Printer_Silbey (1) (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  1:43 PM 
2019] JUSTIFYING COPYRIGHT 439 
that not being able to happen I think are far more damaging, and far more 
wide-reaching.129 
Without being aware, Crosson’s explanation of tolerating unauthorized 
copying rehearses the “breathing room” copyright law intends to enact through its 
extensive statutory exceptions and limitations.130 Copyright law aims to promote 
free expression at the same time as protect works from certain unauthorized 
copying and distribution, an opposition of ideas Crosson identifies in his approach 
to unauthorized copying of his work described above. But both Sinha and Crosson 
extend their tolerance for copying to derivative works and stylistic similarities, which 
would typically be outside copyright fair use.131 
The accounts from both Crosson and Sinha contain an implicit caveat in their 
forbearance. Sarah Newman makes that caveat explicit when she explains that most 
forms of copying would be fine unless they were distorting its meaning to ends with 
which she disagreed. 
I think I generally tend to be in a pretty liberal camp for that sort of thing, 
but I think that there could be definitely situations, especially if I disliked 
the person, or people that were using them, or what they stood for. Like, 
for example, if there was a right-wing political campaign . . . that was using 
it, then I would certainly have a problem with it. In general, I’d really like 
for people to be enjoying my work, and it makes me really happy when I 
go to people’s houses and I remember that they own a piece . . . and I get 
to see it. It’s nice for the work to . . . live in a place where people are getting 
to experience it [and] [h]ave their own experiences of it. [W]hat would 
really bother me[ ] is if something was ripped off, . . . printed really poorly, 
and attributed to me.132 
Many photographers draw the same line. On the one hand, reuse that is mildly 
transformative (or as Crosson says above, in “conversation” with his work) and thus 
likely a derivative use under copyright law is nonetheless okay. But reuses that are 
subjectively offensive in form or content, which may be transformative and thus 
exempt from copyright, should be under the author’s control. Photographers largely 
agreed with Newman’s comment that attribution does not ameliorate an 
unauthorized reuse that may injure the photographer’s reputation as an artist who, 
for example, uses high quality materials or supports certain social or political causes. 
Ali Campbell confirms Newman’s account saying 
I think . . . if someone were to lift my photos and use ‘em in . . . a Breitbart 
news article, I’d be livid, like, right? Because I’d be like, “I don’t  
want to have any association with that.” [I]f someone were to do  
something . . . disparaging[ ] or really bigoted, I’d be really, really upset, 
 
129. Interview with Lee Crosson, supra note 54. 
130. See Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitation and Exceptions, in 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 12, 25–26 (Ruth Okediji ed., 2017). 
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 1049 (1976). 
132. Interview with Sarah Newman, supra note 41. 
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whereas if someone’s like, “I included this in a painting,” or like “I drew 
somebody from one of your photos,” and like it doesn’t really bother 
me . . . . [Thumbs up]. [B]ecause I think if it’s encouraging other people to 
do creative work, that’s good, that’s, . . . fine with me.133 
Photographers describe their relationship to the subject of photographs as 
critical to the purpose of control over the photograph’s circulation and reuse. Ali 
insists that the subject of her work be respected, referring to the people in her work 
especially (portraiture). 
I try and be really cognizant [of posting on my website] . . . especially 
because so much of [my work] is portraiture, and like it’s not just, “Oh it’s 
like my particular art form,” . . . . [T]hese are people with whom I have 
relationships and interactions, and I feel really lucky to be able to interact 
with people, and to be able to take their photos, . . . it’s such an intimate 
thing . . . [to] take portraits[ ] and have people let you do that.134 
This was a common refrain among photographers who took pictures of 
people and whose skill and expertise focused on making people comfortable in front 
of a camera and building trust to have the picture taken in the first place. Stephanie 
Gomez, a young, aspiring, and up-and-coming photographer in New York City, 
expressed sentiments similar to the more seasoned photographers. She seeks to 
preserve the context of her portraiture and documentary work through authorial 
control to protect her subjects. In light of her youth and relative experience, this 
consistency regarding professional expectations is remarkable. 
I think the only thing that would actually bother me is . . . if they put [my 
photographs] in a context in which I wouldn’t, or my subjects wouldn’t 
like. Obviously, when I shoot, it’s really personal, I have to sit down and 
talk with my subjects a lotta the time, and get to know them as people[ ] 
and as friends[ ] [be]cause that’s how I’m really comfortable. When I’m 
comfortable, I can shoot really good work. And if they use it in a context 
that I wouldn’t like, like say something bad about the individual . . . [t]hen 
that’s when I would be really defensive of my work, because . . . it’s almost 
like defaming art, like it’s not cool, and I think that would be my only 
concern.135 
In this account, Gomez relates the experience of photography as a process 
that builds relationships with her subjects and enriches our understanding of lived 
experience. Many photographers explain the joy of making pictures in this  
way—enabling an adventure, connecting people to experiences they wouldn’t 
otherwise be able to see or understand—and thus the injury of unauthorized 
copying is that it demeans the human aspects of the photographic process in the 
first place. This was certainly true of the photojournalists and portrait 
photographers. But insofar as most photographs reflect or contain a human story 
 
133. Interview with Ali Campbell, supra note 55. 
134. Id. 
135. Interview with Stephanie Gomez in N.Y.C., N.Y. ( June 29, 2017). 
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in their making or final form, reuses that defile the subject or purpose of that story 
offend photographic authors. Contemporary photographers emphatically lack 
tolerance for unauthorized uses when the subject of the photograph and the 
relationship the photograph helped establish is injured through decontextualization 
or reuse. 
In these accounts, the photographers repudiate Bleistein’s account of 
copyright’s scope of protection and its purposes. Aesthetic progress requires 
aesthetic freedom, and Bleistein’s logic protecting all uses for which some economic 
value may attach goes too far. Photographers and other authors must be free to 
borrow, be influenced and influence others’ style and vision, and to transform 
underlying works as part of a conversation about the past and the future. 
Developing conversations and relationships by being inspired by previous work and 
drawing upon it is what photographers describe themselves doing. Copyright law 
with its broad right to prepare derivative works and its flexible but qualitatively 
complex fair use standard probably restricts more reuses than do practice norms of 
professional photographers. 
On the other hand, photographers appear protective of certain 
recontextualizations that risk interfering with or infecting the relationship 
established between the photographer and her subject that was elemental to her 
work and its aesthetics. It seems not to matter if the perception of interference is 
subjective and in fact inconsequential to the photographer’s future as a working 
professional. The desecration is personally felt and avoided. Under copyright law, 
however, these reuses may be critical, parodic or simply transformative and thus 
permitted as fair.136 Bleistein’s view of progress to which copyright aims has nothing 
to say about this. However, because it is an anchor in the copyright canon, copyright 
law has ignored self-actualization as a purpose of creativity and authorial attribution 
as a duty of reuse in the assessment of copyright boundaries.137 
Photographers embrace the account of pre-shutter activity and post-shutter 
craft as the mark of authorship, consonant with Sarony’s originality standard for 
granting authorship. The photographers further celebrate access to photographic 
art as a democratic ideal and an opportunity for each person to develop their 
authorial voice. But to photographers, Bleistein’s cleavage of personality and 
progress in favor of commercial exchange as a measure of copyright’s benefit 
ignores the skill, hard work, and experience that endows professional photographers 
with (to them) justified market leverage and control. Contemporary photographers 
would defy Bleistein and defend hierarchies among their ranks irrespective of the 
leveling market power copyright endows: they would agree that some 
photographers justifiably garner higher pay than others and that the personality of 
 
136. 17 U.S.C. § 107; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476. 
137. Beebe, supra note 75, at 394 (imagining a revised regime that excises Bleistein’s “commodity 
fetishism—the erasure of authorial labor” and instead “emphasize[s] that cultural production—and 
culture more generally—does not consist of social relations among works but social relations among 
people, among personalities, by means of works”). 
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the work should be protected as a matter of authorial respect. At the same time, 
those same photographers would insist that Bleistein’s standard that protects all 
works uniformly and without discrimination threatens the necessity of aesthetic 
flexibility to sustain photographic practice. Verbatim copying is and should be 
controlled, on that they agree. But the preparation of derivative works as part of 
aesthetic call and response is a professional expectation. And so the scope of anti-
copying protection would narrow to close to exact copying, if the photographers 
had their way, and the purpose of protection would shift to promote aesthetic 
experimentation, professional development and photographic skills. This leads to a 
direct confrontation with the most recent Supreme Court account of copyright’s 
originality standard and its role in the copyright regime. 
III. FEIST V. RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE CO. AND THE PRIORITIZATION OF 
WORKS OVER WORK 
A. Discrediting Hard Work 
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co., the Supreme Court 
attempts reconciling competing instincts.138 On the one hand, protectable 
copyrightable expression must be “original to the author” (e.g., not the work of 
someone else).139 On the other hand, sometimes the outcome of someone else’s 
hard work (e.g., collecting and arranging data) may be copied by others without 
consequences for copyright law.140 Harmonizing these principles requires 
understanding the originality standard as embodying and celebrating the products 
of intellectual “thought and conception,”141 which may or may not arise after hard 
work. Copyright does not protect hard work per se. And Feist quashes any residual 
hope that copyright aims to reward the labor of authors.142 Indeed, the Supreme 
Court in Feist reminds its readers that copyright’s primary objective is to “promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.”143 This requires that some work—
even work characterized as “sweat of the brow”—be in the public domain and 
beyond copyright protection.144 
As already described, contemporary photographers consider hard work, skill, 
and expertise central to explaining the value they add to the practice of making 
photographs. One question, then, is whether it is possible to harmonize Feist’s 
explanation for rejecting copyright protection in works characterized by sweat of 
the brow alone with the photographer’s accounts that demand payment for services 
and products made from their labor, skill, and hard work. Another question is 
 
138. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
139. Id. at 345. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 347. 
142. Id. at 349. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 353. 
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whether from the attempted harmonization we learn how the absence of copyright, 
despite its risks of uncompensated uses, provides opportunities for developing and 
growing photographic practices in a rapidly diversifying marketplace. The Feist story 
and the photographers’ accounts conflict in their prioritization of labor equity. But 
their conflict helps shed light on troubling industry practices that copyright alone is 
unfit to address as well as on possibilities for alleviating constraints on creative 
productivity. 
The 1991 dispute concerns competing publishers of telephone directories, of 
both white pages and the lucrative yellow pages.145 Rural Telephone Service was a 
public utility that by law was required to compile and publish an updated telephone 
directory, which it funded in part through classified advertisements.146 Feist 
Publications was an independent, private publication company that specialized in 
telephone directories covering a broader geographical area, reducing the need for 
customers to consult multiple directories.147 In other words, Feist directly competed 
with Rural, but Feist typically paid for information it eventually sold, whereas Rural 
collected and wanted to control the information itself. When Rural refused to sell 
Feist its database of 7,700 listings in order to maintain a monopoly over that 
information, Feist copied the listings into its directory anyway.148 Rural’s copyright 
lawsuit against Feist reached the Supreme Court on the issue of whether Rural’s 
directory information and its alphabetized arrangement that Feist copied without 
permission was copyrightable expression.149 
In rejecting the “sweat of the brow” doctrine—which would protect creative 
work based on skill and labor alone that Rural expended collecting its data—the 
Feist Court reaffirms Burrow-Giles’ definition of authorship (“[H]e to whom 
anything owes its origin; originator; maker.”150) and Bleistein’s non-discrimination 
principle that bars aesthetic judgment beyond “the narrowest and most obvious 
limits.”151 The Supreme Court acknowledges that some arrangement or compilation 
of facts would be protectable if that arrangement or selection were “independently 
created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and . . . possesses 
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”152 But facts themselves do not 
owe their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between 
creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact 
has not created the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. 
 
145. Id. at 343. 
146. Id. at 342. 
147. Id. at 343. 
148. Id. at 343–44. 
149. Id. at 344. 
150. Id. at 346 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)). 
151. Id. at 359 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
152. Id. at 345. 
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Census takers . . . do not “create” the population figures that emerge from 
their efforts; . . . they copy these figures from the world around them.153 
The Court reminds readers that “[o]riginality does not signify novelty; a work may 
be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is 
fortuitous, not the result of copying.”154 
By now, we know that contemporary photographers embrace the low 
originality standard on the principle that every human has the potential to express 
personality through authorship, even when aided by a machine that records facts in 
the world. Photographers simultaneously reject the copyright restriction on 
inspirational and stylistic copying that may be similar or derivative of an author’s 
work to make room for professional development and flexible aesthetic practices. 
The copying in Feist was neither stylistic copying nor derivative. No doubt, 
contemporary photographers would consider Feist’s behavior theft. 
But the Supreme Court absolves Feist, simultaneously blessing factual 
compilations as copyrightable assuming original selection or arrangement and 
without judging the aesthetic merits of the directory as such.155 It further deems 
Rural’s directory without copyright protection because a comprehensive, 
alphabetized arrangement of telephone listings (the very characteristics that made 
the directory itself useful and valuable) lacked any “creative spark.”156 “The end 
product is a garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the slightest trace 
of creativity. There is nothing remotely creative about arranging names 
alphabetically in a white pages directory. It is not only unoriginal, it is practically 
inevitable.”157 
Here, too, contemporary photographers might agree that some recordations 
of the real world are so “ordinary” to be left unprotected, harkening back to the 
distinction in Burrow-Giles between intentionally authored photographs and the 
“ordinary” ones on which the Court deferred analysis.158 But Rural’s directory was 
the result of significant time, effort, and expertise, which photographers value.159 
And Feist was a large, capitalized company with intentions to compete, even 
ruthlessly if necessary, which photographers fear in contemporary industry 
practices. One way or the other, Feist was going to publish its directory and cut into 
Rural’s revenue. To this, the Court says 
It may seem unfair that . . . the fruit of the . . . labor may be used by others 
without compensation. [But] this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a 
statutory scheme.” It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,” . . . and a 
 
153. Id. at 347. For a criticism of the idea that facts are not created, see Wendy Gordon, Reality 
as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 94 (1992). 
154. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
155. Id. at 361–63. 
156. Id. at 363. 
157. Id. at 362–63. 
158. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884). 
159. See discussion supra Section II.B.2. 
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constitutional requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to 
reward the labor of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
the useful Arts.” To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas 
and information conveyed by a work. This result is neither unfair nor 
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of 
science and art.160 
The problem with “sweat of the brow” doctrine, valuing labor alongside or as 
evidence of originality, was that it “flouted basic copyright principles.”161 The Court 
held out the possibility of unfair competition claims, but copyright could not attach 
here because it “creates a monopoly in public domain material without the necessary 
justification of protecting and encouraging the creation of ‘writings’ by 
‘authors.”“162 
Feist’s ruling doesn’t impair photographer’s ability to claim copyright in nearly 
all of their photographs, but its rhetoric and description of copyright law’s purpose 
diminishes the importance of the photographer’s time, labor, and skill as a matter 
of authorship. While promoting and celebrating the public domain as essential to 
progress of “science and useful arts,”163 a principle the photographers support, the 
demotion of accumulated hard work and expertise diminishes the professional 
photographer’s status and weakens her market leverage in the digital age when 
making, copying, and distributing photographs is easier and cheaper than ever. 
Moreover, Feist’s hierarchical trump of the public domain over copyright 
protection, while central to the First Amendment and the Constitution’s progress 
clause, oversimplifies problems rooted in unfair industry practices of the new 
millennium when media companies, such as Getty Images, Conde Nast, and Time 
Inc., control access to enormous databases of information and images and prescribe 
burdensome contract provisions for providers and users of photographs. These 
practices undermine photographer’s autonomy as freelancers and depress pay 
scales. They also control information and images that might otherwise be free to 
use.164 Supporting access to the public domain is critical, especially when its 
openness is under siege from many directions and access to information on the 
internet is essential for managing everyday life.165 Contemporary photographers’ 
 
160. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349–50 (citations omitted). 
161. Id. at 354. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 350. 
164. Michael Hiltzik, Photographer Sues Getty Images for $1 Billion After She’s Billed for her Own 
Photo, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-getty-
copyright-20160729-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/AEJ9-MEA7]. 
165. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 351–67 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]ithdrawing 
information from public domain inhibits an important preexisting flow of information.”); Am. Soc’y 
for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., No. 13-cv-1215 (TSC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
14623, at *29 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2017) (referring to the “valid public policy concern that citizens benefit 
from greater access to statutes, regulations, and all materials they must reference in fulfilling their legal 
obligations”); id. (“The ability to know, understand, and communicate the law as a broad concept is of 
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accounts of their professional challenges undermine Feist’s promise of openness 
and reveal other tensions regarding fair labor practices resulting from corporate 
consolidation in our technologically advanced society. 
B. Talking Back to Unfair Labor Practices 
Photographers contend that they are paid for their skill and hard work and 
that both distinguish them in their fields. Time and reputation is also a substantial 
portion of their bill. Because clients rarely return to relicense the photographs they 
originally commissioned, and instead contract for discrete uses within a particular 
time window, the initial contract for photographic services is the bread and butter 
of a photographer’s business. Steve Giralt, a New York commercial photographer 
explains the fee structure: 
In the commercial space . . . . [t]here might be a flat day rate, let’s say five 
thousand dollars a day, and then depending, let’s say they want rights for 
just billboards in Florida for one year, then they might pay five thousand 
dollars for that, and then if they come back later, then “[o]h we wanna use 
it on billboards nationwide,” then that’s a separate thing.166 
What determines the price of these contracts, the day rate and initial usage fee? 
Photographers vary in their responses, but largely the contract is a personalized 
negotiation between the photographer and the client based on a combination of 
factors, including complexity of project, necessary equipment and assistants, time 
for turnaround, reputation and experience of the photographer and prior 
relationship with the client.167 In other words, the photographer and client appear 
to be engaging in a unique fee-for-services arrangement with a specific deliverable 
(use of an image) that is unique to the client and that is licensed rather than 
transferred. Retention of the copyright for photographers resembles an insurance 
 
paramount importance to the continued success of our democracy.”); see also Directive 96/9/EC, of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 
1996 O.J. (L 077) 20–28 (broadening scope of IP protection to databases and proliferating non-
compete agreements). For a general discussion on broadening the scope of IP and proliferating non-
compete agreements, see Catherine Howell & Darrell M. West, The Internet as a Human Right, 
BROOKINGS INST.: TECHTANK BLOG (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/
2016/11/07/the-internet-as-a-human-right [https://perma.cc/E6PD-2QCL] (“Specifically, an 
addition was made to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which states: 
‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media 
and regardless of frontiers.’ Section 32 adds ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights 
on the Internet’ and another 15 recommendations that cover the rights of those who work in and rely 
on internet access.”); see also Human Rights Council Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.20 ( June 
27, 2016); David Kravets, U.N. Report Declares Internet Access a Human Right, WIRED:  
SECURITY BLOG ( June 3, 2011, 2:47 PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/06/internet-a-human-right/ 
[https://perma.cc/CFV5-NX86]. 
166. Interview with Steve Giralt in N.Y.C., N.Y. ( June 27, 2016). 
167. See Jessica Silbey, Eva Subotnik & Peter DiCola, Existential Copyright and Professional 
Photography, Part II (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (documenting pricing 
mechanisms). 
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policy; downstream licensing revenue for previously made photographs is a very 
small part of most photographers’ business, although many insist on retaining 
copyright as a matter of professional practice just in case demand for a photograph 
grows. Professional photographers’ revenue derives mostly from new clients and 
repeats business from old clients who have new projects. Moreover, most 
photographers are independent contractors (freelancers) or they prefer to work that 
way, further emphasizing their autonomy and professional skill in the work they 
perform and produce.168 
The simultaneous demand for more photographs and the rigidity of marketing 
budgets drives down contract fees, forcing photographers to choose between higher 
rates of production and lower quality images, or to differentiate themselves as high-
quality, low production photographers for which higher fees are justified. Again, 
they describe skill, labor, and expertise as driving these distinctions, which 
photographers attempt to preserve and enhance to maintain professional pay scales. 
Steve Giralt again explains this tension in the industry: 
[T]he problem the industry’s happening is, for, as far as people like me, is 
that . . . I would consider myself a high-end image maker. I’m not the cheap 
guy that does the little jobs . . . with high-end image making comes a high 
level of production value, and the amount of people we need, and  
the amount of equipment, and all that stuff. And then . . . usage  
rights . . . determines my fee, with [ ] global print advertising being the 
greatest fee that I’d probably charge for, other than unlimited. And the fact 
that they now [say], “Oh we just want to pay you the fee for, you know, 
Snapchat, which can’t possibly be that much, [be]cause the image is gonna 
be living in such a tiny little world for a second of time,” like “[w]e want 
eight-second rights, we just wanna show it to each person for eight 
seconds,” . . . but with that, the production fee, the cost of making that 
imagery is still the same to me. So . . . we’re having a big fight in the world 
of . . . these clients, . . . they come with this ridiculously low budget, and 
it’s like, no, the production’s the same, if you want me to make the same 
quality imagery, it costs the same amount of mo[ney] . . . . And that’s where 
it’s causing a lot of friction, and the fact that then they’re more likely to go 
to a lower-end photographer, and then their imagery looks low- 
end . . . . so many companies . . . feel that they need to make all this 
content, like “[o]h we need a new image to put on Facebook every day,” 
[or] “[w]e need thirty images a month, instead of one image a month for 
one printout that we used to run,” but their budgets aren’t thirty times what 
they used to be . . . and as the image makers . . . I’m on the side . . . that 
I’m just not gonna make the image if I’m not gonna make it to the level of 
my standard that I make images . . . . [I]t’s just a downward spiral, and like 
 
168. Many staff photographers who produce works-for-hire and photographers who work on 
commission and transfer their copyright under the terms of that agreement express preference for 
freelance work because of the autonomy it can provide, both monetarily and aesthetically. Moreover, 
dedicated staff photographers are rarer today than decades past. And photojournalist staff have 
decreased by half in most newsrooms. Id. 
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they don’t wanna pay for production costs, they don’t wanna pay properly 
for usage, and suddenly what are they paying for[?] [A]nd then also 
suddenly what do their images look like[?]169 
Giralt makes clear, however, that some clients still insist on bespoke, high-
quality images and will pay professional rates for them. 
So I’m not worried about . . . the lower-cost stuff, [be]cause for the most 
part, so much of it is crap. What I worry about is when suddenly high-end 
stock is sold really cheaply, [be]cause then[,] now, those are images that a 
client might not hire me to shoot anymore [and] they might go to stock 
for. But for the most part, most clients aren’t gonna buy a Shutterstock 
image . . . for anything important . . . . Also . . . a lotta things I shoot are 
specific to a client, so it’s not like . . . a Victoria’s Secret bra, they’re not 
gonna find that on stock.170 
The pool of high-end clients is limited, diminishing (or consolidating) opportunities 
for photographers who depend on those clients to sustain their professional 
practice. When labor is cheap, and expertise or skills are not part of the price of the 
copyright license that clients negotiate, low-end and amateur images become a 
business norm. 
Photographers describe two distinct but related harms stemming from the 
devaluing of skill and expertise and consolidation of media publishers despite 
platform diversification. The first is reduction in wages. The second, related to the 
first, is the perceived reduction in quality and the characteristics of photographic 
images that dominate media and audience attention. As to the first, we’ve heard 
already how contract term accretion inures to the publisher’s benefit, not to the 
professional photographers, spiraling downward the prices for professional 
photography which carries with it a degradation of journalistic ethics among other 
values. A long-time photojournalist explains the rapaciousness of publishers. 
“[A friend has] been in the field since the Vietnam War, and he refused to 
sign that contract [that claimed all rights], even though he had a decades-
long relationship. So now they wanna own forever, everything you 
take . . . . So this is what [the publishers are] thinking[:] “We don’t know 
what kinda company we’re gonna be, and so we just wanna scoop 
everything up.” Which is the ethos of the culture. And the other ethos of 
the culture is, undermine everybody, and pay the lowest amount you can 
possibly pay.171 
She goes on to explain specifically, 
the value of the picture, the individual picture, the price for an individual 
picture has gone way down . . . . So it used to be that a picture printed this 
size or smaller . . . [o]n a page this big . . . 8 by 11 . . . [y]ou charge maybe 
$150, $125. The same picture now . . . . [O]pening picture of a major story, 
 
169. Interview with Steve Giralt, supra note 166. 
170. Id. 
171. Interview with “Noreen” in N.Y.C., N.Y. ( July 21, 2017). 
First to Printer_Silbey (1) (Do Not Delete) 1/28/2019  1:43 PM 
2019] JUSTIFYING COPYRIGHT 449 
it could license for 75 bucks. So that would normally have been a double 
page in a magazine . . . that would have gotten you twelve, fifteen  
hundred dollars. So a quarter page in a magazine, tiny, the smallest picture 
[then] . . . is higher than what you get now, all right? [Photojournalists 
survive today by] looking for grants. There’s a lot more grants, and there’s 
a lot of photographers, I mean, the aesthetic of photojournalism has 
changed, because of the business model as well, so there’s a lot of 
photojournalism that’s more mixed in with a kind of art-ish documentary 
style, which has created a lot of ethical debates . . . . but the idea is to then 
try and sell more on the art market.172 
Photographers describe this combination of the reduction in price, broad 
contract terms without more compensation, and the resulting low-quality images as 
the “good enough” problem.173 They claim aesthetic quality is more diverse (and 
tending toward the amateur end). And, industry practices (and copyright rules) that 
devalue skill and expertise in photographic production reduce the intentional 
rendition of the photographs, decreasing aesthetic standards for photography. 
Photographers also complain that desire for immediate images, without sufficient 
or expert production and rendition, or without the time-consuming investigation 
and research that makes long-form journalism reliable and nuanced, renders our 
image culture shallow and repetitious rather than conscientious and diverse. Ashok 
describes how despite countervailing pressures he works within this changing 
industry maintaining his own level of aesthetic quality. 
I can’t rely on . . . people looking for . . . a low-cost provider, and saying, 
“Oh, you know, why would I pay you x when I can have it for nothing?” 
[A] lot of commercial jobs have gone that way, which could have  
been a commission job. Even commission work, the fees have come 
down . . . . They feel like, “Oh, you know, I can get this image off the shelf, 
for a lot less.” You know, my biggest competition is the good-enough. 
Because a lot of people are OK with good-enough, and so . . . I’m trying, 
and I have tried to steer away from the clients who like the good-enough. 
Because the good-enough is not good enough for me. I want clients who 
want the best, and wanna know that[ ], “this is what we want. I wanna hire 
a professional.”174 
Carl Tremblay, a veteran commercial photographer, echoes this sentiment, 
connecting the impatience digital cameras inculcate and their ease of use with the 
decrease in aesthetic quality of a vast amount of photographs online. 
The digital, I think, [ ] has brought in “it’s good enough. It’s good enough.” 
And [ ] I think it . . . steals better work from being done, because you have 
the ability to look in the back of the camera and say, “We got it.”175 
 
172. Id. 
173. Interview with Ashok Sinha, supra note 98. 
174. Id. 
175. Interview with Carl Tremblay, supra note 111. 
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One response, propelled by the logic of Feist, is that competition is good for 
consumers (or clients), lowering the cost of products and of barriers to entry for 
market producers. Two directories are better than one and the customers can decide 
which they would prefer to purchase. This is also an answer from Bleistein that 
reduces all aesthetic value judgments to the existence of and opportunities for 
commercial exchanges. But the photographers are not clearly complaining about 
copyright protection as such, which is the focus of both Bleistein and Feist: whether 
or how (photographic) works can be protected from copying by others. 
Contemporary photographers are not like Rural Telephone Service Company 
worried about a competitor scooping their exact work product and reselling it for 
less (although to be sure, some photographers are worried about uncompensated 
copying). Contemporary photographers are worried largely about their professional 
status and the devaluation of their craft—the specificity and quality of the work that 
is produced, the ability of audiences to distinguish quality within a crowded 
marketplace, and thus the willingness of clients or news outlets to pay for carefully 
and skillfully made photographs. This is particularly true among photojournalists, 
one of whom said explicitly 
[w]e need to talk about ethics more, like in general . . . as a profession. I 
don’t know [if] ethics are as stressed as they used to be . . . [we] used to get 
memos all the time, and I just think now, with fewer people, there’s fewer 
mentoring, there’s less mentoring . . . everybody’s worrying about just 
getting the job done, not necessarily about taking the time . . . . 176 
Absent a professional class of photographers, whose skill and expertise shape the 
expectation of a truthful and powerful work product, photographers worry that 
photographic aesthetics will resolve at the lowest common denominator. 
Why is this a problem? And doesn’t the idea of an aesthetic standard return us 
to the problem of judges engaging in aesthetic discrimination to the detriment of 
fomenting and diversifying art and science? The story of Feist revolves around the 
binary of the public domain and copyrightable subject matter. The optimistic story 
in Feist is that facts or information are free, and unoriginal expression is 
unprotected, leaving a public domain sufficiently robust to be the foundation on 
which science and art may be built. But this assumes the background of a fair 
marketplace. The photographers’ story assumes the baseline of Feist’s public 
domain principles but unravels its optimism, describing a social situation in which 
shrinking wages, lopsided contract negotiations, consolidated media outlets, and 
disorganized freelance photographers have to work harder than ever before to earn 
a livable wage to make truthful and powerful pictures. A veteran photojournalist 
who now teaches full-time in a journalism school explains 
there were publications that paid people to [produce investigative  
photo essays]. I mean, our whole industry now is just like survival. I 
mean . . . what you expect of a photograph. What it takes to get a 
 
176. Interview with “Martha” in Bos., Mass. ( July 10, 2017). 
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photograph. Now, people just want something quick and dirty and throw 
it online, it doesn’t have . . . lasting value. [Y]ou had Time[,] Life, [and] all 
these publications . . . [like] National Geographic . . . in its heyday, [which] 
was just really encouraging, you could make a living much easier. Being a 
documentary photographer now, very few people can be a documentary 
photographer.177 
It is tempting to think that some photographers have it worse than others, for 
example, that photojournalists struggle more than commercial or event 
photographers, and thus that one may shrink in population more precipitously than 
the other.178 But all interviewed photographers told the same story about 
contemporary challenges to their business models and altered aesthetic practices. 
The photographers’ stories contemplate a range of aesthetic practices and a 
spectrum of aspiring and professional photographers but warn of the dangers of 
copyright in the age of digital reproduction that devalues labor, skill, and expertise, 
which form the basis of the photographic art. If this sounds radical from a copyright 
perspective, it is only because a story about property rights as opposed to labor 
rights is the easier story to tell given U.S. copyright’s legacy. 
Feist does not protect professional photographers from acquisitive publishers 
and intermediaries, who are photographer’s primary concern today. Photographers 
embrace the ubiquity of authorship and welcome amateur photographers into the 
market place because they have faith that skill and experience will differentiate 
themselves among clients and justify professional prices. Feist’s rule provides room 
for differentiation, but the photographers didn’t need Feist to permit copying facts 
or the natural world. Making new things from nature defines the photographer’s 
art.179 Feist’s abolition of “sweat of the brow,” however, diminishes the value 
photographers create through client-centered services and time-consuming 
journalism. This devaluation of bespoke and laborious efforts refocuses 
photographers on the possibility of wages earned from downstream copyright 
licensing, which is typically a small part of professional photographers’ wages as 
significant downstream licensing is minimal for most but the luckiest of 
 
177. Id. 
178. As a qualitative study, I can only attest to the variation among contemporary 
photographers, not the distribution of those variables in the population at large. The next phase of this 
research will be a survey which results will hopefully be able to answer some of the questions about 
differences among photographers as regards wages, contract terms, and employment. 
179. Moreover, photographers would agree that the facts of the world, and most of what they 
photograph, are “free” to make into pictures without permission. Commercial photographers often 
obtain subject releases when making portraits, and sometimes even collect permissions from authors 
or trademark owners of work visible in the background. But in general, photographers rely on the 
principle developed by necessity in their practice, and which Feist reflects as policy, that facts and ideas 
are in the public domain to enable communication, cumulative production, and creativity. For 
photographers, this is uncontroversial in light of the norms of their practice that rest on stylistic 
borrowing and influences as well as copying for the purposes of conversation and productive 
transformative aesthetics. 
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photographers.180 When contractual terms no longer reflect the value of skill, hard 
work and experience because of consolidated media companies’ demands and the 
photographers’ lack of bargaining power, Feist’s rule is a kick in the gut. It justifies 
all forms of copyright in minimal creativity (because authorship is open to everyone) 
and rejects skill, hard work, and expertise, which define the primary assets on which 
photographers’ livelihood depends. The combination of these two correlatives to 
the Feist rule leave professional photographers without negotiating leverage in a 
market crowded with amateurs who gladly work for reduced wages or gratis in order 
to build a repertoire and reputation, only to learn later that opportunities to sustain 
a full-time professional photograph practice are waning. 
We may celebrate Feist’s winners as the amateur photographers or the rival 
market entrants (Feist Publications over Rural Telephone) who bring competition 
to the field. There is virtue to this position if we think market competition stimulates 
aesthetic progress and that is the purpose of copyright. To be sure, Feist’s winners 
are not professional photographers for whom “sweat of the brow” anchors their 
aesthetic and business practices. Moreover, photographers don’t divorce labor from 
intellectual conception, as Feist does, and we might want to consider whether that 
is a good idea. The photographers’ stories link labor and aesthetic progress. 
Photographers do not distinguish between copyright justifying payment, as the chit 
that authorizes those uses, and the development of aesthetic skills and expertise, 
which produce the desired photographs in the first place. As such, professional 
photographers would not entirely rewrite Feist. But Feist’s demotion of skill and 
hard work alongside its promotion of originality, which nearly any work and anyone 
can demonstrate, amplifies the significance of the photographers’ criticism of 
contemporary labor and contractual practices in the photographic industry. 
Authorship is immaterial when contracts of adhesion claim all uses of the author’s 
work and wages spiral downward. The only “capital” in which photographers can 
reliably invest is their time, labor, and skill, but these investments are worth much 
less under copyright law after Feist. Thus, photographers struggle to reap the 
benefits of their labor and skills in light of rapid technological reproduction despite 
working harder than before. 
The social situations that Feist and professional photographers describe in 
their diverging accounts of copyright’s scope and purpose highlight these advancing 
risks to the digital domain: bloated originality standards level access to authorship 
(ostensibly a good thing) but authorship’s significance as a value to cultivate not 
only for its material consequences but also as a matter of diverse voices and 
identities depends on leverage in contract negotiations that most individual authors 
do not have. Feist’s depreciation of skill and experience assumes there are other 
ways to differentiate oneself in the market as creator or innovator, which of course 
 
180. The devaluation of hard work and refocusing on downstream licensing opportunities, may 
also amp up photographers’ complaints about unauthorized reuses of photographs on the internet on 
Pinterest, Google or elsewhere because all losses of revenue are now more critical than ever. See Silbey 
et al., supra note 167, at Part II (describing revenue streams). 
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there are. But the stories photographers tell remind us that those differentiating 
measures also depend on industry norms of apprenticeship and access to 
professional networks. These include ethical training in aesthetic production as well 
as differentiated pay scales that preserve an expert status in order to reproduce 
skilled techniques and high-quality work products. 
CONCLUSION 
In the description of their aesthetic practices making pictures of the world, 
photographers explain the structures to which they are subject. Sometimes the law 
shapes and constrains their behavior, but often structure comes from other 
photographers, clients and subjects, photographic equipment, and limitations of the 
natural world (lighting, shadows, and distance). The photographers’ stories start 
with the act of creativity and eventually plot copyright’s role (or the role anti-
copying rules play) somewhere within their complex and evolving business and 
aesthetic practices. The photographers’ accounts are about work and 
professionalization as a basis of aesthetic value and about contract and client 
relationships as the basis of material wellbeing. Anti-copying protection as a feature 
of copyright law plays only a cameo role in an intricate and diversely plotted story 
about the contemporary aesthetic and business practices of professional 
photographers. 
Seminal copyright cases in our Supreme Court cannon describe creative 
practices of copying—of which photography is one form—within the context of a 
dispute about law’s constraint on copying and its role promoting creativity.181 By 
definition, the cases concern law, but their stories about creativity also describe 
contested situations concerning the role of copying in the production of valued 
aesthetic works against a background of evolving mechanical reproduction. While 
the photographers’ accounts plot a story that begins with an inherent contest 
between originality and copying—the nature of photography itself, as 
photographers acknowledge—the court cases begin as stories about contested 
features of copyright law and in their resolution justify differential treatment of 
varying aesthetic practices, from photography, to lithography, to automated 
compilations. The legal cases describe a hierarchy of aesthetic practices in terms of 
copyright protection but reject aesthetic judgment as a feature of copyright law. The 
photographers reject a hierarchy of aesthetic practices but accept aesthetic judgment 
as a feature of photographic art. Reading the photographers’ stories alongside the 
court disputes amplifies the hidden accounts of copying in creativity, copyright’s 
restraint on copying, and thus copyright’s restraint on creativity. 
The role of copyright in this eco-system of digital industries, expert 
professionals, and diminishing opportunities for differentiated skills, is as a property 
right that photographers today experience as less relevant to their livelihood 
although central to their identity. Copyright nonetheless remains central to 
 
181. See discussion supra Sections I (Burrow-Giles), II (Bleistein), III (Feist). 
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publishers and licensing platforms. And it is here where the old story about the 
origins of our contemporary copyright system returns: copyright serves interests 
other than authors.182 Perhaps this is as it should be to promote dissemination of 
science and the useful arts. But growing the public domain, a goal copyright 
ultimately serves, and advancing creative practices, which copyright is supposed to 
accomplish, are not the focus of current regulatory reform and remain fragile 
bulwarks on which to build a reform agenda. So what purpose does dissemination 
serve without these other essential features of our copyright system? Photographers 
tell us that we need better or adaptive protections to facilitate bargaining between 
authors and publishers that would (1) attribute authorship more widely (to align 
with originality standards), (2) require payment for works reflecting professional 
skill and expertise, and (3) narrow the range of actionable copyright infringement 
(e.g., derivative works) to enable more work to be done. In this way, photographers 
resemble other independent authors whose intellectual property rights are less 
relevant than everyday employment and labor issues.183 Photographers may present 
a special case in terms of the fast evolution of their art and business mechanisms, 
but they raise concerns shared by many about the digital age’s measurement of 
progress—more not better, efficiency not affordability—which await analysis and 
redress in the twenty-first century. 
 
 
182. MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993). 
183. SILBEY, supra note 53, at 274–78 (summarizing findings). 
